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As has been the trend for quite a few years now, the significance of the Internet is still
steadily growing, whether in the personal, occupational or even national context. More
and more data is being saved to cloud services, personal information is being made
available over social media networks and all of that data is being collected, analysed
and unified with other bits of information by numerous different operators for their own
purposes. The most common use for a person's personal information has to do with
more customized advertising, and it is a very common occurrence nowadays. Google
shows customized advertisements based on your search, several sites have advertise-
ments based on how you landed on the site, even video games display customized
advertisements to you as a part of their scenic backgrounds. Based on this we know
there is a market for the information of what content you as an internet user search for.
At the same time as we are wilfully publishing more and more personal information
about ourselves in several different social media platforms, concerns about privacy is-
sues are being brought up more regularly. A typical internet service which requires
registration and offers users the opportunity to buy goods online is required to have
some information about its customers. This blob of information includes but is usually
not limited to real name, living address, email address and telephone number. Addition-
ally the user is most often given the option to save their credit card information to the
service, in order to speed up the checkout process within the service by removing the
need to input lengthy serial numbers. Considering a service like Sony's Playstation Net -
work (PSN), servicing millions of users daily, it should come as no surprise that it is a
high priority target for a malicious attacker and successful hacks into a service like the
Sony PSN can have huge repercussions [Wil11]. 
So we know that an internet user's personal information is something that different
agents, malicious or otherwise, want to get their hands on. Additionally we know that a
lot of advertising platforms and companies utilize data on what content internet users
search for. What is not as often brought up is the fact that even the information of who
you are talking with is perceived as valuable information for some. For example, the
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National Security Agency (NSA) in America has collected this so-called “metadata” for
years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, until very recently when that right expired and
was not renewed [Mac15]. Encryption allows two communicating parties to be reason-
ably assured that the contents of their communication stay private, but the problem is
that the parties themselves are still easily discernible. It is fairly easy to see why this
would be a problem, examples include a reporter talking to a source wishing for an -
onymity on a volatile subject that might garner the notice of intelligence agencies, such
as the Snowden case, or a network of political activists against the current political ideo-
logy in a conservative and censorship-prone nation like China. The examples are
extreme and deal with certain types of people, but there are also scenarios that concern
the general population as well, such as a married man or woman who talks to a lawyer
about divorce. Basically any dialogue with someone where one or both parties want to
keep the dialogue itself a secret is in jeopardy via this collection of metadata, or more
accurately, traffic analysis. The parties may of course try to circumvent this by utilizing
a link to the internet which is not directly linkable to him or herself, like using a com -
puter in an internet café. However, it may not always be feasible to search for such an
internet connection and obviously it negatively impacts the ease of use of the internet as
a communication medium [PfW86].  It should also be noted, that it is theoretically pos-
sible for a malicious operator to hold control over all the components needed for
communication, including the internet service providers, routers and autonomous sys-
tems on the path of the messages, even make himself seem like the intended target of
your messages. In these cases it is virtually impossible to have a technical implementa -
tion that would protect the user from losing information to parties he didn't intend the
information for [PfW86].
In time, several different technologies have emerged that all try to somehow hide the
participants of any given message exchange. Together they are called anonymous over -
lay networks, overlay network meaning that they are networks build over the traditional
IP network, but utilizing their own routing protocols. Some of these anonymous overlay
networks include GNUnet, Freenet and the popular Tor network. Each of them have dif-
ferent motivations and views on what is the most important aspect of anonymisation for
their users. GNUnet and Freenet are mainly anonymous networks used for anonymous
sharing of data and files, while the Tor network utilizes onion routing, a way of emphas-
izing anonymisation of communicating parties. 
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1.1 IP network routing
In the internet, two machines communicate with each other by sending each other a
number of datagrams or packets. In theory one packet sent by a web server to a client
computer could contain one web page the client's web server would then render as a
page for the user, but nowadays the size of one complete message is regularly far
greater than what one packet can contain. Therefore for the delivery of one complete
web page, for example, several packets have to be sent between the machines [KuR08]. 
The maximum size of a packet is not a constant, but can vary depending on the physical
quality of the wires. This is important to note, because through this we come to under -
stand that because the whole physical network for the internet actually consists of
separate links of physical wires between two routers, the maximum supported packet
size could theoretically vary between every two router [KuR08, Com13].
Earlier we briefly mentioned routers and links. Routers are physical machines equipped
with the capability to receive a packet and determine where to send it next. A router is
typically connected to at least two different networks, A and B, so we say that it has a
link to network B. We call this connection to network B a link because it is thus implied
that there may be more routers on the way from our router to this target network
[KuR08]. The router can receive a packet belonging to a bigger message from one ma -
chine on network A and determine if the packet needs to be forwarded to network B or
back to network A. This determination is done via a routing table, a logical construct
which has instructions about where to forward the packet based on the destination IP ad-
dress in the packet headers [KuR08].
1.2 Traffic analysis and measurement
The act of traffic analysis actually governs a wide array of methods and tools. In the
widest sense of the term, it means the measurement, categorization and analysis of
transmission of packets, their timing, contents, frequency and destinations. The aim is to
gather relevant information regarding e.g. possible problems within the network – like
congestion – and performance evaluation for services and points of improvement, as
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well as for accounting purposes [Wil01, KWH05].
The methods for this analysis vary greatly and they incorporate both software and hard-
ware approaches. The hardware approach to traffic analysis usually requires that a
special-purpose hardware tool is installed within the network somewhere close to a net -
work hub, multiple routers under heavy load. These hardware solutions are often quite
reliable and accurate but often very expensive. By contrast, software solutions usually
tend to be cheaper, but might not provide as clear of a perspective by comparison. Soft-
ware solutions might be either modified network drivers with packet-capture ability on
several different workstations, or it might be some traffic classification algorithms run-
ning on the server-side [Wil01, KWH05].
1.3 Overlay networks
In the most general sense, an overlay network is a group of devices forming a connec-
tion between each other utilizing some other protocol or logic than what is provided by
the underlying network infrastructure. Most usually the underlying network infrastruc-
ture is the normal IP network, but in some cases it might also be another overlay
network. Whatever the case, the nodes or devices in the overlay network are connected
through a logical or virtual link. What is notable is that the logical link is not concerned
with the distance of the nodes through the underlying network infrastructure [JGJ00].
Therefore, overlay networks are distributed networks in nature, no single authoritative
server is in charge of keeping the network topology in memory and knowing how to
route messages, but rather they are self-organizing [LCP05]. Curiously, it should be
noted, that the IP network itself started as an overlay network for the telecommunication
network, the logical link there being the IP address itself. 
The motivation for building an overlay network is to strive for a better quality of service
(QoS) in an internet service. Traditionally overlay networks have been constructed to
provide some form of efficient multicasting – a way of sending one message to multiple
recipients – or to provide effective content distribution [JGJ00, LCP05]. Nowadays
these overlay networks have been built in multitudes, mostly building on top of some of
the most known and effective overlay network schemes, like Chord or Pastry [LCP05].  
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1.4 Anonymous overlay networks
Anonymous overlay networks or anonymous networks are a specialized sub-category of
overlay networks, with focus on masking and obfuscating as much information about its
users as possible. Encrypting messages is possible and encouraged even with commu-
nication over the traditional IP network, therefore anonymous overlay networks focus
on protecting sender and recipient anonymity as well as their separation, meaning that
the sender of a message cannot be linked to a recipient of a message [PfW86]. 
Over time, several different types of anonymous overlay networks have risen. Most not -
able types are file-sharing overlay networks like Freenet, and anonymous web browsing
and communication overlays like the Tor network. 
It is prudent to note, that even though this master's thesis focuses on the effect of an-
onymous overlay networks on traffic analysis and classification methods and their
ability to protect user privacy, user privacy is not completely guaranteed by successfully
masking communication partners or the used applications, which is what traffic analysis
and classification aims to achieve. It is enough for a malicious agents to successfully set
out any user from a crowd for future tracking. This act is called fingerprinting and an
example how this might be achieved is by following a user's mouse scrolling patterns
[Nor16]. Another approach is requesting HTTP headers to specify browser plugins and
their versions, which might be enough to single any user out. So even though an-
onymisation of traffic is an important aspect of user privacy, it is important to keep in
mind that the whole problem domain of user privacy protection is far larger.
1.5 Structure and research question of this thesis
In order for us to properly understand the motivation for these anonymous overlay net -
works, we need to take a closer look at the motivation for building these networks. In
this master's thesis we will familiarize ourselves with the workings of routing in tradi -
tional IP networks, how it enables traffic analysis, what is traffic analysis and what are
the potential implications for personal information security, and how three different an -
onymous networks handle these threats.  
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In the chapter IP network routing, we will start with the most common knowledge, the
way traffic is routed in a normal IP network. We will cover areas related to path selec-
tion for messages, like how routing tables are constructed, how delivery semantics
affect path selection, and what are autonomous systems and how does having to traverse
through multiple autonomous systems affect path selection choices. Different routing
protocols are also discussed, and the importance of different routing metrics in regards
to the choice of your routing protocol is brought up.
In chapter three, we will involve ourselves with the act of traffic analysis. Different
modes of analysis will be introduced and the possible repercussions on privacy will be
discussed.
After we've learnt why we would want to hide our communication from traffic analysis,
we will then take a look at different tools that enable us to do so. Chapter four, “Overlay
networks”, will familiarize us with the concept of an overlay network and what it means
to have a network built on top of the IP network. The concept of overlay networks will
then be expanded with the concept of anonymous overlay networks, overlay networks
with the single focus of masking their traffic within the underlying IP network. Three
different such anonymous overlay networks will be presented, the GNUnet, Freenet and
the Tor network. For each overlay network we will discuss how they accomplish their
anonymisation and compare it to what we already know about different means of traffic
analysis.
In chapter five we will present results of running a Tor relay node as a case study for
this master’s thesis. After running a relay node for a few months, we will take a look at
how much traffic has been routed through it, in how many routing groups has it been a
part of and from where in the world has it received data. This is interesting as a valida-
tion for the popularity of the Tor network, and it will also imply something about the
current needs for such traffic anonymisation around the globe.
Finally, in the Discussion section we will pull together what we've learned and present
final thoughts about the effects of analysing internet traffic in bulk, and how overlay
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networks help combat these problems.
For our thesis, the main points of interests are the effect of traffic analysis on privacy,
and the ability of a given anonymous network to protect its users from this breach of
privacy through methods of traffic analysis. Additionally, we want to know if the Tor’s
perceived popularity in part due to claims of strong anonymity is translatable to anec-
dotal evidence from running our own relay node within it. We can therefore form our
primary research question thusly: “How does traffic analysis degrade an internet user’s
anonymity and how do GNUnet, Freenet and the Tor project offer effective protection
against traffic analysis methods?” Our secondary research question has to deal with the
popularity of Tor, and is as follows: “Can Tor’s perceived popularity be witnessed from
the viewpoint of a single relay operator as high traffic volume and a large number of
connections?”
2 IP network routing in IPv4 networks
As previously stated in the Introduction section, the act of routing means forwarding a
datagram or message composed of multiple packets over the network to its destination.
This routing and forwarding is performed by the router devices within the network,
which is useful to keep in mind throughout this section. Routers are connected to differ-
ent networks – and therefore other routers – through multiple network interfaces built
within the routers. 
When a client wishes to send a message to another specific device, it must know the IP
address of the recipient and record it into the header information of the message being
sent. The sender will then submit the message to the network by figuring out the correct
router to pass the message to, which will then receive the message, review the destina-
tion IP address and figure out whether it is in direct connection with the destination or
whether it needs to forward the message onwards to the next router [KuR08]. 
When performing routing, the router usually is not in direct contact with the destination
device, and therefore can not directly forward the message to the right destination.
However, all devices connected to the internet belong to a network, which might be a
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part of a little bit bigger network, which all together comprise the internet [KuR08,
Com13]. That is not to say however, that all networks are contained within another, but
they are all connected to each other. The IP address of a device is comprised of the sub-
net address and the device address parts, meaning that a router will always route packets
towards the correct subnet and the router for the correct subnet usually is usually the
first one to be interested about knowing the exact device address. 
It should be noted that as part of the TCP protocol, each received packet is acknow-
ledged by the destination machine to the sender. There are also other minute details
related to the protocol of sending and receiving messages, as well as relating to the
physical limitations of the network used [KuR08]. However, as we are interested in the
act of routing, we will omit those details in this section. Additionally omitted is the pro-
cess of resolving a name against a destination IP, which is the domain of Domain Name
Services (DNS) but which can be for the purposes of this thesis thought of as a fairly
straightforward transaction where the client contacts a DNS server with a URL and the
DNS sever responds with an IP address. 
Although the exhaustion of IPv4 addresses is currently one of the biggest problems of
the IP network and the switch to IPv6 addresses is ongoing, this document will mention
only IPv4 addresses where applicable. This is due to the fact that the version four ad-
dresses are easier to keep track of due to their more compact form, and because no
matter the used IP address space, the mechanics of routing will remain the same.
2.1 Path selection
Routers all have the common purpose of routing received packets to their intended des -
tination. Towards this goal they have to figure out the correct direction, that is, the
correct next router closer to the subnet that houses the destination device. The determin -
ation process is possible because of the hierarchical nature of IP addresses and more
specifically the subnets. We already know that IP addresses are made up of a subnet or
network number part and the device address or host number part. Additionally, IP ad-
dresses are classified to one of three different classes, which determines how big of a
portion belongs to either part [KuR08, Com13]. 
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As previously mentioned, a router receiving a packet checks the destination address
from the headers. If the address matches a network the router is directly connected to,
the router will broadcast to all the devices on that network a request for the physical or
MAC address of the device at the destination IP. The destination device should respond
with its own MAC address, at which point the router will forward the packet to its inten-
ded destination.
If the destination address does not match any networks the router is directly connected
to, it will compare the address against its routing table which contains directions for
packet forwarding. The entry with the longest matching prefix in common with the
packet's destination address will be chosen and the router will forward the packet ac-
cording to the instructions in that entry [Com13]. If no entry matches any part of the
destination IP of the packet, most routers also have a default entry as a fallback. Default
entries might most commonly be seen in household routers that are usually connected to
just the household's network and to the internet service provider's (ISP's) network
through its single network interface. In these routers the routing table might be just the
default entry for all packets to be forwarded to the ISP's network. In cases where there is
no default entry and there is no match in the routing table, the router simply drops the
packet and informs the sender.
Through the aforementioned forwarding or routing logic, it is theoretically possible that
a packet could be lost indefinitely in the internet, for example due to erroneous routing.
To counteract this, IP packets have a Time To Live (TTL) information set in the headers.
The TTL is a number ranging from 1 to 255 and represents the number of times a packet
can be forwarded before it must be dropped. Each receiving router must decrease the
TTL by one and drop the packet if the TTL reaches zero. When a packet gets dropped
due to its expiry, the dropping router sends back to the source IP address a so called In-
ternet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) message informing the sender of the packet's
expiry [KuR08, Com13].  Because a sender can not directly affect the route its data -
grams will flow through, there is not much the message originator can do but retry
sending in the hopes that the error was due to some temporary problem in the network,
perhaps additionally setting the TTL value to be higher than it was on the initial send
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operation. 
Through the expiry notification system, an interested party can get some knowledge of
routing done on the way to his intended destination. A common network diagnostics
tool called traceroute uses this feature in packet forwarding protocol and sends success -
ive packets to specified destination IP with increasing TTLs starting from 1. Thus,
because the first router, then the second router, etc. will send back a notification of
packet expiry, and the notification will carry information about the sender – the router
that dropped the initial packet – the user will gain knowledge of the chain of routers his
packets will travel through on their way to the destination device.
2.1.1 Routing table
Like we already know, every packet has a destination towards which all routers forward
said packet, based on the IP address in the headers. A routing table is a logical construct
in each router the device consults for instructions on through which physical link it
needs to forward the packet through.    
A single entry on the table consists of at least three things: the network IP, a gateway IP
and a cost metric. The network IP is self-evidently the intended destination of the
packet, and the gateway IP is the address of the next router the packet needs to be for -
warded to. The cost metric is some assigned value representing the gravity of using that
specific route. The basis of the assigned value is dependant on the used emphases but
could for example represent the latency of that route, or the number of hops as a multi -
plier compared to other routes [Com13]. Routers might also have more data associated
with an entry, like the physical interface the network is configured to. Table 1 shows an
example routing table for some machine. The netmask information in the table repres -
ents how many bits of each 8-bit block the address has used for the network part of an
address. For example on row 2 the network 192.168.0.0 has a netmask of
255.255.255.0, meaning that the network part consists of the first 24 bits and therefore
the last 8 bits are reserved for host addresses. 
The gateway information in table 1 leads us to two bits of information about the device
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and where it is connected to. The next hop destination for default and the subnet
209.85.128.0 is 192.168.0.1 but for the subnet 192.168.0.0 itself it is set as
192.168.0.100. Since our device has two hosts known from within that specific network,
we can easily conclude that our device must actually reside in that network. Further -
more, the second bit of information would be to conclude that since our device
communicates into that network through the address of 192.168.0.100, it probably is the




0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1 10
192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.0.100 1
209.85.128.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.0.1 1
Table 1. An example routing table
The way routers determine which interface to use is called the longest matching prefix
system and involves the device going through its whole routing table and checking the
destination address against each of the table's entries. Now, because of the explosive
growth in the number of devices connected to the internet, and the routing tables nature
as a small logical construct preserved most often in a router's very limited memory, it
has become a challenge for routers to contain all of the required information to all of the
reachable networks [KuR08, Com13].
2.1.2 Subnets
The most simple explanation for a subnet is that it is an isolated part of a normal net -
work. A subnet behaves like any other network, in that it usually reachable only through
a gateway and that it can be governed by its own firewall rules. This mechanic is most
often employed by sites where more fine-grained security on the network level is re-
quired or when a hierarchical structure of networks is desirable for routing purposes. A
subnet can be formed on an arbitrary point in an IP address's bit position, through Class-
less Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR, which, as the name suggests, is designed to allow
more efficient routing within a single domain [Com13].
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Historically IP addresses were classified and handed out in one of three standard
classes, A, B or C. Each of the classes corresponded to 8-bit boundaries of an IP ad-
dress, so that a class A address used the first 8 bits of the whole 32 bit IP address space
for representing the network, and the rest for representing hosts. Respectively, a class B
address reserved 16 bits for networks and 16 bits for hosts, etc. [KuR08]. However, this
scheme was quickly found non-scalable because of its inflexible nature – many sites re -
quired more hosts than a class C network would allow with its 256 host addresses, but
far less than a class B block's 65 536. These sites were however being handed class B
address spaces, which then started to quickly run out, due to there being only roughly 16
000 of them. This is the IPv4 address exhaustion problem in a nutshell that we are deal-
ing with even today. 
The solution CIDR introduced, was the ability for sites to decide on an arbitrary bit in
their address space, from which to split their own network into two subnets. As such, a
subnet then is a logical but visible splitting of network into two. This split is notated by
using the normal decimal notation of an IP address to denote the network part of the IP
address and concatenating a forward slash and the number of bits used for the network
part of the address. Therefore, a normal class C address in CIDR notation could be e.g.
156.28.243.0/24 and a subnet for that network could be 156.28.243.64/26. In that sub-
net, the two most significant bits of the last 8-bit block are now used for the network
address, namely the 8th (27) bit is set at 0 and the 6th (27) bit at 1. Furthermore, because
these two bits are now used for network addresses, we have actually created a total of
four subnets: 156.28.243.0/26, 156.28.243.128/26, 156.28.243.64/26 and
156.28.243.192/26. The number of hosts for each network is the number of bits left in
the 32-bit address space of the IPv4, that is 6 bits or 64 devices with host address parts
between 0 and 63 [FuL06]. 
Earlier we shortly mentioned that the growing size of a routing table is an increasing
problem as well. CIDR partially helps combat the problem with a mechanism called
prefix aggregation. In this aggregation system, if some part of the network address parts
match, they can all be stored in the routing table grouped under the matching part of the
prefix. E.g. if fifteen network addresses with the network address part length of 24 bits
13
share 20 of those bits, they all can be stored as one entry with a network prefix of /20
[FuL06]. 
What CIDR enables is for IANA and other authorities in charge of handing out IP ad-
dresses to hand out smaller blocks of IP addresses and in that way combat the problem
of IPv4 address space exhaustion. The other solution is the emergence of the IPv6 ad-
dresses, where addresses are comprised in the same way, but the address space is 128
bits. How subnetting works is important for the purposes of our thesis, since it deepens
our understanding of the structure of networks and how it affects routing. 
2.1.3 Delivery semantics (unicast, broadcast, multicast, anycast, geocast)
Thus far, when we have spoken about routing, it has been in the context of routing one
message or datagram to one recipient based on its network location. This is the most ba -
sic scenario of routing and is actually called unicasting, one of several addressing
methodologies used in the internet. When talking about addressing methodologies, it is
important to keep in mind that what we are discussing is how to select recipients for
messages and how to route the messages to them [Com13, KuR08].
Broadcasting, by contrast to unicasting, is the act of sending one message to all devices
in some network or subnet. It does not differ greatly from unicast, the source device
sends a packet to a networks so-called broadcast address, which has been decided to be
the all-ones of the host part [Mog84, Kur08]. That means that for any network, the
broadcast address is the address where all bits left for the host part of the IP address are
set as ones. So, for example a 192.168.0.0/24 network, the broadcast address would be
192.168.0.255. Upon receiving a message for the broadcast address, the router will rep-
licate the packet for all devices connected to the destination network.
Multicasting is a method of sending from one host to many receivers, using a so-called
multicast address or group address. Since an IP packet header still needs to contain only
one destination address, a special group address is constructed, that interested clients
then specifically join using Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [Com13].
Multicasting scales pretty well, since the source device only needs to send one packet
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and the necessary replication for all the needed recipients is done by the packet-for -
warding devices. For routing purposes, multicasting determines the direction of the
packet flow by taking a look at the source IP address, which should be a simple unicast
address, and routing the packet away from that, towards the appropriate networks where
there are devices that have joined the network using IGMP [Com13, Dee88]. 
Anycast is an addressing method where multiple servers are assigned the same network
IP and advertise that address to routers. When a client wishes to send a message to that
IP address, the routers compare possible routes against their attached metrics values.
Most usually the packet is then forwarded towards the network with the lowest cost at-
tached to it, meaning in IP network routing the network which can be reached with the
least amount of hops. Anycast is mainly used to provide increased quality of service for
decentralized services, most well-known example being the current Domain Name Sys-
tem (DNS) [Har02].
Last common addressing method is the method of geocasting. Geocasting requires spe-
cific geo routers, whose job it is to determine if a packet destined for a specific
geographic location is within its service area. A geocast packet's destination is defined
either as a point, a circle with a center point and a radius, or a polygon defined through a
list of points. Geo routers define their own coverage areas as a union of all the geo-
graphic areas covered by the networks attached to the router. The routers share this
information amongst themselves and build routing tables from that information
[Rüh09]. 
2.1.4 Autonomous systems
A big part of the current routing schemes is the concept of autonomous systems (AS).
As the name suggests, they are self-governed collections of connected network ad-
dresses that define a common routing policy to the internet. An AS number can be
requested from an Internet Service Provider (ISP). 
The autonomous system serves as a kind of encapsulation towards the outside world.
For the purposes of the outside world, they only see the routing policy of the ISP and
don't really have to care about the internal workings of the AS. The AS, by contrast, can
have its own routing policies within its own domain [Com13]. The term domain here
15
refers to the grouped networks governed by the entity in charge of the AS.
Autonomous systems have also played a big part in the development of some of the fea -
tures of today's internet and network services. For example, in order to provide global
connectivity without laying down wildly redundant physical networking, ISPs some -
times loan or buy a part of the communication bandwidth of a part of network owned by
their competitor. Understandably this carries a cost for the buyer, and therefore they
want to avoid utilizing their competitor's network wherever possible. Through autonom -
ous systems and the ability to define their own routing protocols and routing metrics,
the ISP is able to assign a cost in their routing metrics based on who owns the network
the route would connect to, or some other metric like the cost of bandwidth, latency, etc.
2.2 Routing protocols
The act of routing or packet forwarding should not be understood as a protocol for rout -
ing. The act of a router forwarding some packets is the execution of a well-defined
algorithm, like we have seen in previous chapters. However, a routing protocol actually
means the logic of constructing the routing tables for routers. It has to deal with the act
of routers announcing their routes within a network and collecting received information
of other routes and filtering them into a complete and most optimal routing table
[Com13]. 
In this chapter we will discuss different models of routing protocols and where and how
are they used and implemented. In this chapter, the role of an AS will also become more
prominent when we discuss the need for different types of routing protocols depending
on the routing needs in relation to autonomous systems. 
2.2.1 Routing metrics
We have already talked about how a metric value is attached to each route in the routing
table. In a scenario where multiple possible routes are found in the routing table, the op -
tion with the lowest metric value is chosen [Com13]. Most usually this metric is a
representation of the path length, meaning the number of hops along the path to the des -
tination network, but other simple possibilities also exist. For example, the metric might
represent the maximum transfer unit (MTU) of the path to destination. MTU is the max-
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imum size of a packet the network can transfer, so it directly dictates the number of
packets a message has to be split into. The greater the number of packets, understand -
ably the longer it takes for the message to be completely transferred to its destination.
Therefore, if the MTU for a particular route is really low – meaning the message needs
to be split into a greater number of packets – the cost for that route will be set higher to
reflect the greater time needed for the message to travel [Kur08, Com13]. In addition to
hop count or MTU, other simple metrics might include latency, bandwidth or the path's
reliability, meaning how much packet loss has been experienced on average on that par-
ticular route.
Due to the costs of maintaining the physical aspects of networking, it stands to reason
that ownership is split between multiple ISPs, each having built a part of the network as
part of their business. The business of ISPs is to rent out usage of their network to cus -
tomers, and this applies to personal customers and enterprises alike. What's noteworthy
is that ISPs will, in order to offer their own customers the best possible service and con-
nectivity, rent usage of their competitor's network as well. Naturally the ISP renting out
its part of the network will want to bill its competitor according to their usage. This is
possible, because the IP address blocks the ISP has been assigned are public knowledge.
The renting ISP, in turn, will want to avoid using competitor networks when their cus-
tomer tries to reach a network reachable from the ISP's own network with a reasonable
metric. They can assign a modifier to any metric based on how many competitor net -
works the route passes through, and how much will they be billed in each. The metric of
any route is usually not based on just the bill accrued, but it is also possible if an ISP
wishes to always avoid using competitor networks.
2.2.2 EGP and IGP
How routing tables are constructed is a matter of choice, made by the network adminis -
trators. There are multiple different options available, but before choosing the used
algorithm, one must first understand the position and role of the router in question.
There are two main uses for routing protocols: intra-AS and inter-AS, that is, the routing
done within an autonomous system and the routing done between autonomous systems,
respectively [Com13]. For the former purpose, the group of routing protocols are called
interior gateway protocols (IGP) and the latter group is called exterior gateway proto-
cols (EGP).
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For the IGP family, there are two main ways of approaching the problem. In one scen -
ario, the routers do not have the full picture of the network topology, in the other they
do. The former type of routing protocols are called distance-vector routing protocols,
while the latter are link-state routing protocols [Com13]. 
If a router is not allowed to have a full picture of the network topology, then it must re -
ceive information about paths in some other manner. In the distance-vector routing
protocol most commonly used, the Routing Information Protocol (RIP) the path inform-
ation is advertised by routers to their neighbours, who are then able to update their own
routing tables based on this new information. In the first iteration of the RIP algorithm,
this advertisement was done via broadcasts every 30 seconds, but when network sizes
began to grow, it quickly became apparent that an advertisement cycle once every 30
seconds would be a heavy burden on the network, especially considering that not every
router would even participate on the RIP routing. Therefore, in version 2, the advertise -
ment is done as multicast messages [Com13, Mal98].
In link-state routing protocols, the routers will have complete information of the whole
network before they start constructing their routing tables. The information is spread via
advertising; each router will send a message to every one of their neighbours, identify-
ing the router itself and all of its neighbours, excluding the one the advertisement was
just sent to. These advertisements carry with them a sequence number, which is used to
identify the most current information at a receiving node [Com13, ClJ03].  The routers
will then construct a routing graph for themselves using some form of Dijkstra's al-
gorithm. An example of link-state routing protocol is the Open Shortest Path First
(OSPF) algorithm, which instructs the routers to build their routing table using round-
trip time, data throughput, link availability and reliability as metrics for each route
[Com13].
When performing routing between autonomous systems, the routing protocol most often
used is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). A BGP-router receives its neighbouring
ASes through manual configuration, after which it will advertise these learned routes to
its peers and the IGP-routers within its own AS so that they know of the networks
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reachable outside of their own AS. This data is also propagated through the AS to pos-
sible other BGP-routers on another edge of the network, with different neighbours
configured for it. BGP, operating with multiple ASes, has the capacity to take into ac -
count multiple different metrics, including the cost of using a specific route through a
competitor's network by taking into account its cost in the form of billing [Com13,
RLH06].
2.3 Summary
In this chapter we have taken a look at the most important features and aspects of the
traditional IP network routing scheme. The section serves as important groundwork for
the reader to familiarize himself with the most fundamental of concepts related to traffic
forwarding in the internet.
Throughout this thesis it is important to keep in mind, that even though we do not expli -
citly bring up the IP network when talking about message forwarding in e.g. overlay
networks, all overlay messaging is eventually similar IP packets than all other traffic. 
3 Traffic analysis
As we have seen in the previous chapters, a lot of the routing information is made pub -
lic for simplicity. The source and destination IP addresses are public for every router on
the way to check, the destination port is public and barring the use of encryption like us -
ing the HTTPS protocol, even the contents can be read by the routers.
It is no surprise then, that the data readily available by reading packet headers is utilized
by different actors. This act of gathering information from messages is called traffic
analysis and is inherently not a bad or unethical process, even though nowadays the
term has gathered quite a notorious reputation. Traffic analysis can be, and is, used for
network planning, problem detection and usage reporting. For example, we have talked
about how different ISPs bill one another for usage of their network. This billing would
not be possible without traffic analysis, because the packets originating from a compet -
itor's network are revealed as such because of the source IP address. All packets are
inspected and the ones that need to be billed separately from a competitor are tallied for
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later use [MYH05].
Today's challenges in traffic analysis have to deal with the huge amount of traffic going
through the networks in each given moment, and the fact that with the emergence of
several P2P platforms, streaming software, online gaming etc., accurate identification
has become increasingly more difficult [EMA06, MYH05]. In this chapter we will take
a look at what the act of traffic analysis entails and what are the possible approaches
used when trying to figure out what are the packets flowing through a given network.
Lastly, when these methods are more familiar to us, we will also discuss what this act
means for user privacy and the assumed right of anonymity on the internet for all users.
3.1 Traffic classification
In today's internet, traffic classification is done for a lot of other reasons other than
simple billing between ISPs. Numerous network administrators want to know what type
of traffic goes through their networks for reporting purposes, data collection etc.. Often
the publicly available IP packet headers are not enough to identify the traffic, due to the
increasing number of protocols and platforms build on top of the normal TCP/IP stack.
Trying to identify traffic using only this publicly available information will usually lead
to 50-70% accuracy [MoZ05]. However, in 2005, network administrators reported that
for example peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic constituted over 50% of their total traffic, which
is not usually identifiable based on just the IP packet headers [MYH05].
In this chapter we will discuss the most common traffic classification techniques cur -
rently in use. We will focus on the software-based classification techniques, since they
are more prevalent and widely deployed. The more traditional techniques, port number
and payload analysis, are discussed and shown to be still valid and applicable tech -
niques but ultimately not fully equipped to catch and reliably identify the multitudes of
new applications emerging nowadays, especially in the field of P2P traffic [EMA06]. To
supplement these traditional techniques, machine learning techniques have been imple -
mented in the field and with good results.
Machine learning techniques are traditionally split into two different sets of algorithms:
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Either the supervised or unsupervised approach [EMA06]. Machine learning in itself is
at its core a set of algorithms that are learning from example data. This means that the
data itself specifies what is a good or right answer to the questions pertaining to the
same dataset. Mentioning the dataset previously, both styles of machine learning require
some sort of training set to get it going, but the difference between supervised and unsu-
pervised come in the form of the dataset. For a supervised machine learning algorithm,
the dataset needs to be classified or labelled. Each data point tells the learning algorithm
what are its most meaningful characteristics and values. From there on, the algorithm
can with pretty good probability recognize similar new data as belonging to existing
classes. An example of a supervised machine learning algorithm is a Naïve Bayesian
classifier [MoZ05].
On the other hand, an unsupervised algorithm, while still requiring the starting dataset
as learning material, does not require the data to be classified as anything from the start.
The algorithm runs over the given data and tries to cluster similar data together. In other
words, it will invent classes based on the data it gets and assign the starting set and all
new data according to those classes in the future. Additionally, it will fine-tune its clas -
sifications based on new information it receives when analysing new data, meaning the
classes are not static and often are prone to change.
Hardware-based traffic classification exists as well. It requires specialized machines in-
stalled at an operator's server room, close to the network routers. Although the machines
are reliable, they are often really expensive and work better as a traffic measurement
tool rather than traffic classification tool, since they can be outfitted with traffic classi -
fication algorithms, but they would need to be regularly updated as well [Wil01].
No matter the chosen approach, to enumerate a few of the challenges a traffic classifica -
tion algorithm has to overcome: first, many applications utilize application-layer
protocols that might be encrypted; applications use port numbers that are not IANA-as-
signed and therefore not easily traceable; many new applications, most notable
streaming applications, can utilize multiple sessions to transfer different sets of data. In
the case of streaming services, one session might transfer control- and other metadata
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and another session the multimedia data itself. These sessions can also use different
transmission control protocols, especially video streaming is traditionally done with the
help of user datagram protocol (UDP) [KWH05].
3.1.1 Port number analysis
Traditionally, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has assigned set port
numbers for different protocols to use, and is then subsequently used by a lot of tradi -
tional applications [KWH05, EMA06]. This set of well-defined port numbers has made
it easy to track applications using those ports historically and is the basis of the port
number analysis technique. For example, normal HTTP traffic uses the port 80, and HT-
TPS uses the port 443 by default and email uses the port 25. When traffic utilizes one of
these well-defined port numbers, it is easy to also classify and identify the application
in charge of that traffic. Until the emergence of a lot of today's streaming and gaming
platforms, this approach was moderately successful in classifying traffic, but recently it
has been shown to achieve less than 70% accuracy [KCF08].
The problems traffic classification based on port number analysis has to face is that
many applications nowadays don't use the IANA-assigned port numbers, either because
they want to hide their identity or for some other reason. They can either use ports of
other applications or assign port numbers dynamically per session and deliberately
avoid the set of well-defined port numbers. Especially P2P file sharing applications tend
to hide their identity from classification, while media streaming platforms utilize many
simultaneous sessions, sometimes sharing a port number [MoZ05, KCF08]. 
Bottom line is, if the IP packet does not specify a port number in the headers that is also
present in IANA port number list, then this approach is not applicable and therefore port
number analysis is most prominently a statistic on how much traditional traffic is being
routed through the network. By traditional we here mean traffic that obeys the standard
port numbers. From the above, it follows that the accuracy of port number analysis is in-
versely proportional to the amount of P2P traffic in the network, but when a link
primarily has to deal with traditional applications such as WWW, DNS, Mailing, FTP
and SSH flows, this approach can still be highly successful, reaching accuracies of up to
90% and more [KCF08].
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3.1.2 Payload-based analysis
Out of all traffic classification methods, payload-based analysis of packet traffic is the
one with potentially the most negative impact on user privacy. In this approach, the
packet flow is searched for characteristic signatures of known applications. Signatures
here mean specific contents of packets or some combination of headers – like source
and destination ports – and content. It is based on the fair assumption that applications
have similar communication flows each time they are communicating with another ap-
plication or a client [EMA06, KCF08]. Once the algorithm has been supplied with these
known signatures of applications, it will perform extremely well in identifying those ap -
plications it has been taught about, even identifying applications otherwise known to be
hard to classify like streaming and P2P traffic [KWH05, EMA06]. 
The aforementioned privacy concerns naturally rise from the fact that a network oper-
ator has the power to read contents of packets flowing through his network. While other
analysis mechanics avoid using flow-specific data, payload analysis is wholly based on
reading and analysing specifically data specific to an instance of communication. This
means that every single time payload analysis is performed on packets, it is specifically
checking unique information about that communication session in the form of packet
headers and its contents.
One of the main downsides of utilizing payload analysis is the fact that it is much more
computationally heavy and requires more storage capacity, because those requirements
are directly proportional to the amount of traffic the system wants to capture and inspect
and that in turn implies greater cost for the analysing system. Other than that, the ana -
lysis system needs to have been pre-taught about the applications it is required to
identify, meaning that new or otherwise previously unknown application traffic will still
go unnoticed by a payload analysis system. Finally, because payload analysis is based
on looking for signature characteristics of packet flows, encrypting your traffic under-
standably interferes with this method, because the flow will no longer match any known
signatures. Therefore, protecting your traffic by using HTTPS communication wherever
possible seems to be one easy and feasible way of achieving a decree of protection
against this classification method [EMA06, KWH05, KCF08.
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3.1.3 Machine learning based analysis
The basis for machine learning techniques is to conceptualize a communication session
between two devices as a continuous, bi-directional flow of messages between the two
endpoints. Because the session is based around some application, it stands to reason that
the messages in said flow should share some characteristics, like packet length, number
of packets in a message, destination port, etc. These machine learning approaches both
rely on this assumption and strive to classify flows under analysis to one of pre-existing
clusters the algorithm has formed based on its training data [MoZ05, EMA06].
For both supervised and unsupervised approach, the process for deploying them is sim-
ilar. First, there is the clustering process, in which the algorithm is given the training
data and forms clusters or classes based on common characteristics within that dataset,
the execution of which varies depending on the type of clustering used [EMA06]. In this
scenario, the dataset is an example set of message flows, either crafted or recorded real
examples. For a supervised machine learning algorithm, the training data has been hand-
classified has been shown to achieve accuracies of up to 95% [MoZ05]. By contrast, the
unsupervised algorithm's dataset has not been touched in any way beforehand, and it
performs the clustering by itself. Therefore, the unsupervised algorithm does not have
any a priori understanding of the correct or true classification of applications. A good
result of clustering process should be clusters in which entities within a single cluster
share a lot of similarities, but entities between different clusters have almost nothing in
common [EMA06]. 
3.2 Implications on privacy
One of the cornerstones of the internet has been widely thought to be the inherent an -
onymity. If you are someone with beliefs, ideas, opinions or data that the authorities
would deem unacceptable, the internet has traditionally been the place where self-ex -
pression has been possible without fear of persecution. The aforementioned scenario is
somewhat naïve for sure, but still very possible and reality in countries where human
rights are not as strictly enforced. An easy example from 2016 is Russia's current trend
to persecute homosexuals, which understandably leads to such individual's need to hide
their identity when discussing the matter. China's Great Firewall is a concept in itself,
aiming to filter any and all material that the government deems unfit to be seen by its
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citizens. Side effects of the Great Firewall and similar policies are imprisoned and house
arrested reporters that have been found to have spread sensitive material that contradicts
the official news outlet's versions about China's internal state. The great majority of
these cases have roots in the government's ability to follow and track internet traffic
through ASes within their own borders, enabling them to identify certain actors through
packet inspection.
Of course, the whole internet quaked when in 2013 Edward Snowden revealed NSA's
mass surveillance operation PRISM. PRISM represents an unprecedented level of sur-
veillance on internet traffic, regardless of the origin of said traffic [GrM13] and
understandably raises questions and concerns about any unencrypted traffic being sub-
ject to potentially malicious operators listening in. We bring up PRISM as one of the
most blatant breaches of internet's anonymity to serve as proof that there is a real pos -
sibility of people in places of authority having an interest in secretly following users
across the internet. 
It can then be argued that the internet is not inherently anonymous and is not meant to
be such. After all, IP packet headers are public and they specify IP addresses of both the
destination and the source. Additionally, HTTP protocol is not encrypted by default,
meaning it is made possible for other parties to listen in on conversations. Lastly, often
repeated is the phrase that someone who has done nothing wrong has nothing to hide.
And certainly, if we accept these premises, then there is no moral implications to discuss
about traffic analysis and what is left is only the academic curiosity of what is the effect
of traffic analysis techniques on an abstract thing called privacy. However, it is our be -
lief that while privacy for sure is an abstract concept, by accepting the above premises
we essentially deny the right to privacy altogether. Privacy, and the right to thereof,
means that you have the right to expect that your communications between any other
person stays between you and the person you have chosen to communicate with. If there
is always reasonable doubt of someone listening in on your conversations, you arguably
never have any privacy or at least always act like it. This act of self-censorship is one of
the most heinous results of continuous surveillance that has been realized, because we
start modifying our own – completely legal – behaviour according to the belief that
someone is listening to everything we say or do, even on the internet [MaT15, Gre14]. 
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The essential aspect of privacy that traffic analysis places under jeopardy is source an-
onymity. What is meant by this is the ability for the sender of any message to expect
that his or her message will not be traced and used to reveal the identity of the sender,
and through identification the geographical location of the user is also easily found out
[FJZ11]. Even though the aforementioned traffic analysis methods do not explicitly
state that they can be used to this effect, it is easy to see that each of them can very eas-
ily be outfitted with such capabilities. Additionally, when traffic analysis is performed
en masse, it is important for the reader to understand that the techniques mentioned
above are not deployed separately, but more commonly in unison, enhanced with the
ability to read source IP address, perhaps even the ability to connect that IP address to
the internet connection currently holding it, and who owns that connection.
It is interesting to note that until Snowden's reveal of the PRISM and other mass surveil-
lance endeavours by the American government, there has not been a chance to gather
academic data about the effects of surveillance on the large public. It should be expec-
ted, that a revelation of that magnitude would be strictly followed by the same public,
because it is expected that people are interested in their own privacy. To some extent
this turns out to be true, we know that people tend to start censoring their own searches
and online behaviours directly after such a huge exposure, but at the same time it is also
noted that continuous exposure around the same subject seems to suffer some diminish-
ing returns on their popularity. Generally it seems that big reveals on surveillance do not
seem to garner much interest and do not hold it for long [Pre15].
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have taken a look at traffic analysis and its different methodologies.
We have elaborated on why IP traffic is inherently easily identifiable and traceable, and
what might be the motivations for any entity to do traffic analysis. At the same time, it
is important to note that some of the analysis techniques, particularly port analysis, has
suffered some falling out because the myriad of different applications and protocols us -
ing non-standardized ports make it more difficult to categorize traffic based on used port
numbers alone.
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After getting familiar with the various normal traffic analysis techniques we have dis -
cussed how these might be harmful for a person's anonymity. Even though traffic
analysis is not in any way illegal, and indeed has its roots in the effort of quality of ser-
vice and maintaining the health of a network, we have pointed out that there are
multiple scenarios in which an internet-user would want to keep his or her identity
secret, for fear of any kind of persecution, that is put in jeopardy by traffic analysis,
either done for monetary or political purposes. The current trend of increased surveil -
lance, as we have shown, also begets and cultivates a culture of self-censorship,
meaning that a lot of people might not find the help or answers they use the internet for
in the first place.
4 Anonymous overlay networks
We have already given an outline on overlay networks and defined them as machines
being linked together through a virtual or logical link, running on top of another net-
work, either another overlay or the IP network. The overlay network is most typically an
application-level network, meaning that the host computers are running some form of
software that enables them to access said overlay. By extension then, an anonymous
overlay network has all the same characteristics of a normal overlay network, but addi-
tionally it strives for user privacy or anonymity through various different means. 
At the same time as we are talking about anonymous communication or anonymous
overlay networks, it should be kept in mind that rarely is the aim of an anonymous over -
lay network to offer anonymous communication in the sense that the communicating
parties do not and can not know or identify each other. The option to identify yourself
via communication is always present and is actually usually even encouraged in order to
establish trust between communicating persons [GRS96].
The presented motivations for building these networks vary, but seem to revolve around
the same desire: the desire for stronger privacy, be it in the form of more secure commu-
nication, stronger validation of your communication partner's identity, preventing others
from listening in on your conversations or making sure that you can share material with
other people without any parties finding out where or from whom the material origin-
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ates from [BGT02, CMH02, GRS96]. 
There are naturally a lot of different motivations to develop and implement an anonym-
ous overlay network. In the context of anonymous overlay networks, anonymity can be
mostly defined in two different scenarios. Anonymity for communication participants
we have already covered and defined as source anonymity before [FJZ11]. The other
purpose that's common for an anonymous overlay network is to enable users to share
data without it being possible to track the origin of the data to a person, namely file
sharing. 
In the past, most anonymous networks have been developed for the latter purpose, to fa -
cilitate anonymous file sharing. But with the rise of increased network surveillance, it
has become more popular to use a network which hides your communication and traffic
altogether. It is somewhat ironic, that the increased network surveillance is in part due
to the illegal side effect of anonymous file sharing – piracy – which the copyright in-
dustry wants to keep in check by increased network surveillance.
In this section, we will be covering three different anonymous overlay networks and
outlining the methods of how they work and how do they attempt to secure privacy for
their users. Since the view we have chosen for this thesis is the way traffic analysis
-based privacy problems are handled in different anonymous overlay networks, and
since a case study of a Tor network node utilization is a part of this thesis, some special
focus has been given to the onion routing paradigm and the Tor network in general.
4.1 Routing in an overlay network
Generally, routing in an overlay network follows a pattern akin to routing in the IP net -
work: if a node has direct knowledge of where in the network a message's recipient is, it
will direct the message straight to it. Otherwise, it will attempt to pass the message on
towards the correct destination.
Unlike the IP network, overlays are usually not divided into different ASes or subnets,
but instead their routing tables are constructed using some form of optimization based
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on the knowledge of the overlay network's structure [CDG02]. For example, in a distrib-
uted hash table (DHT), a type of overlay network designed for easy data input and
retrieval,  implementation named Chord, the keyspace is thought of looping from the
maximum id number back to the minimum id number in the keyspace. Each node's rout-
ing table, called finger table in the implementation lingo, is the size of the number of
bits in the keyspace. The ith entry in the finger table for node n has the closest node's ad-
dress, whose key is closest to the value of n + 2 i-1 in the keyspace chosen. This
optimization is possible because of the conceptually circular nature of the keyspace, and
leads to O(log n) lookup time [SMK01]. Figure 1 shows an example of how the logar-
ithmic search nature leads to skipping a lot of nodes on each early step, until the
message is closer and closer to the intended target and the intended recipient key is
close to a known node in a node's finger table.
Figure 1. Example of routing in Chord. Node 65a1fc routing a message to d46a1c [CDG02]. Dots on the 
circle are routing nodes. 
Other routing implementations of course exist, but the one presented in Chord is some -
thing that is pretty common and exemplifies the idea that due to the exact knowledge of
how the network is constructed, it allows the designers to come up with an efficient
routing algorithm. Also of note, that since the overlay network runs on the application
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level, it does not care, and indeed is not supposed to care, how the message is actually
routed to its destination on the network layer. Of course that's something that will hap-
pen, because IP packet forwarding is still the way messages are actually routed to
destinations. However, ignoring that allows the designers to more elegantly design their
overlays, and by paying attention to proper encryption and other techniques, it is pos-
sible to achieve the wanted level of privacy that is the purpose of our anonymous
overlay networks. 
4.2 Freenet
The chronologically first anonymous overlay network in our sample set, Freenet is a
file-storage application that utilizes free disk space on its client's hard drives that the
users decide to allocate to Freenet's use. The authors of Freenet deemed it important to
categorize Freenet as a file-storage application rather than a file-sharing application,
since one of the core functionalities of Freenet is to replicate inserted data to multiple
nodes in order for it to remain accessible even in the case of the original host of the data
becoming unavailable. In a normal file-sharing application the case often is that if the
file has not yet been downloaded by other nodes, and the original host then goes offline,
the file will be unavailable even though demand for it would suddenly emerge. Freenet
tries to counteract this by copying the file to multiple nodes initially on file insertion
[CMH02, CSW00]. 
In this section we will take a look at how Freenet functions, and how are some of the
basic functions like storing and retrieving a file made possible. Afterwards we will re -
flect this against the methods of traffic analysis and find out, if there is some sort of
method we can use to break Freenet's anonymity.
4.2.1 Overview of functionality
In order for a node to join the network, it must first generate itself a public and a private
key. The public key will act as the node's identity within the network, which will work
even in the case of a physical address change for the node. The new node has to have
knowledge about another, existing node within the network in order for it to be able to
send a notification about itself. This knowledge might be gained through some node list-
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ing on the internet or other out-of-bands communication. The information notification
contains the new node's public key and physical address, which the receiving node will
propagate through the network until the TTL on the notification runs out. At that point,
each node that has received the notification will participate in forming a random SHA-1
GUID for the new node. The GUID will also dictate the new node's responsibility area
within the Freenet keyspace, and using the SHA-1 algorithm all but guarantees that no
collisions for objects occur [CMH02]. 
In order for a user to insert data into the system, he will first have to generate key-hash
for the file by hashing a short descriptive string about the file. This key-hash is then
considered an insert proposal and sent to the user's own node, accompanied by a TTL
value. When a node receives the insertion proposal, it just needs to check its own stor -
age to see if the same key already exists. If no collision is detected, the node routes the
notification to a node within its routing table with the GUID closest to the hash value of
the file that is going to be inserted. This process is performed until the insertion notifica-
tions TTL runs out, at which point, if no collisions have been seen, the insertion is
approved and the file can be inserted into the network. In this case, the initiator then
sends the file down the same routing path as with the insert notification. In the case that
the key already exists, the insertion is denied, because there has been a key collision.
Additionally, the original file will be returned with the decline message, making an at -
tack in which a malicious node floods the network with files, infeasible. Along the path
of insertion, each node verifies the data against its GUID, stores it and creates a routing
table entry associating the data source, who will be named in the insert-message, with
the new key. To prevent the obvious security problem, each node can randomly decide
to change the insert-messages data source identifier to point to either itself or to another
randomly assigned node [CSW00]. If a node cannot forward the insert message to its
preferred recipient, it will backtrack to the second-closest GUID within the routing
table, and so on.  
When retrieving data from the network, the process is almost equivalent to the insertion
of data. The query initiator will hash the description of the wanted file, and send it to a
node in its routing table. If the key matches a key in the node's local storage, the file is
returned along with an indication that it was the source of the data. If the node does not
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locally possess the file, it will forward the request along to a node with a GUID as close
to the file's identifier as is possible with the node's routing table. This process will be re-
peated until the request's TTL runs out or the file is found and subsequently returned to
the original seeker. If the file is found somewhere along the search path, it might get
stored locally to some nodes along the search path. As with the insertion, nodes have the
option to decide to swap the data source identifier of the return message to point to
themselves [CMH02, CSW00].  It should be noted, that this operation does not impede
any further queries for the same file, because the node who decided to change the data
source identifier still retains the real data source in its own local routing table [CMH02].
Freenet also utilizes signed subspaces for some form of data management. Signed-sub-
space keys (SSKs) are set up to function as kind of folders that should contain only
similar data within them. Because these subspaces need to have their own public and
private keys generated for them, every member of the network can read the contents of
the subspace, but only the owner of the subspace can write to it. By contrast to normal
file insertion, inserting a file to a subspace requires the node to hash the concatenation
of the subspace's public key's hash and the hash of the file's description string, then
signing it with the subspace's private key. Similarly, retrieving a file from a subspace re -
quires only the public key of the SSK and the descriptive string of the file in question
[CMH02].
Through the routing of messages in Freenet, a couple of interesting effects can be iden -
tified. First, because queries are forwarded to nodes that have GUIDs similar to the key
being inserted or sought after, they will continue to get queries for similar keys. Because
of this, they will also store and cache those files more often, over time becoming highly
specialized in returning content with specific keys, leading to better performance in
queries over time. Second, a node's connectivity increases over time. This is due to the
fact that as node's process returning requests, they create new entries in their routing
tables, indicating the suppliers of files, thus increasing connectivity for themselves. This
is helpful for a new node to gain more insight about the network, but in order for the
node itself to be found more often, it needs to insert files or indicate itself as a data
source in requests it processes [CSW00].
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Due to users sometimes wanting to hide the file's contents itself from prying eyes, it is
also possible to encrypt the file's content before inserting it to Freenet. In that case 
4.2.2 Effectiveness against traffic analysis
Looking at traditional traffic analysis methods, they seem to offer some valid data about
Freenet. Through payload analysis, given that the contents are not necessarily encryp-
ted, an observer might gain insight on what is the data being transferred within the
network. Because of local caching of files, however, it is not certain that two parties
communicating and transferring files are actually the original requester and original
owner of the file in question. Of course these techniques are dependent on the fact that
the observer puts up a node within the network, but given that Freenet is open for join -
ing nodes, that will not be an issue for any actor. 
Because of the file-sharing nature of Freenet though, a malicious observer is probably
mostly interested in finding out the sources of certain files and the requesters for those
files. On the subject of finding out the source of a particular file, it would prove ex -
tremely difficult, because after a successful insert of a file into the network, the file is
actually already hosted by multiple nodes, and the tracking of the original one would
not be possible. However, when the file is being inserted, the notification we have
talked about earlier is basically just another query with an original source. An attack has
been devised that is able to trace a request back to its originator, called the traceback at -
tack [TDB03]. We furthermore note that due to the way requests are processed in
Freenet, we can count every node that has seen a particular request, as communicating
with the source node. Additionally, because of the requirement for a node to announce
its physical address when joining the network, and the address in essence being an IP
address, real-world identification for identified originators is a very real possibility.
The traceback attack hinges on the fact that each request in Freenet has a particular UID
value attached to them. These UIDs or transaction IDs are not guaranteed to be unique,
they are randomly-generated 64-bit identifiers. But because these IDs are only stored at
the nodes forwarding or processing them for as long as the processing is still unfinished,
they are only important for as long as the query is traversing the network [CSW00,
TDB03]. 
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The first step in the attack is to attach a malicious node m to a suspect node n in Freenet.
The problem is that a node in Freenet is allowed 40 neighbours in its routing table, and
they are based on how close their GUID is to the node's own and how many requests the
node has served. If n already has the maximum amount of neighbours, it is allowed to
exchange the least recently used node in favour of a new node, if the new node's neigh -
bours have served at least a minimum number of content requests [TDB03]. This is
apparently to ensure that the new node has gathered enough information about the net -
work to be an effective part of it. In the event that m is not accepted as a neighbour for
n, and given that the GUID for n is known, we can choose to insert a large number of
files so that their keys cover a sufficiently large area around the suspect node n
[TDB03]. Then a different malicious node a can be used to request these files, which m
will serve to a, until the minimum number requirement is satisfied. After this, a new at-
tack node b can be announced, with a GUID close to both n and m, who now has
neighbours who have served a number of content requests to this point. If this new node
is still not accepted as a neighbour for n, we can repeat this process until some sub-
sequent node becomes a neighbour for n.
After having attached a malicious node to a suspect node, by way of sending special
probe messages, used for debugging purposes, with the UID of an interesting content re-
quest (interesting here denoting interest in the part of an attacker), and an invalid
destination location, which usually identifies the intended recipient for the debugging
information, the malicious node can create a message that the suspect node will answer
with a specific error in case of a conflicting UID, but will not propagate to other nodes
within the network, because the invalid destination location renders the probe message
invalid for processing [TBD03]. The malicious node will then wait for a content request
message of interest by trying to match the routing keys of requests to the predetermined
routing keys of interest to it. When such a request is detected, the node will gain the
content request message itself and the set of neighbouring nodes for the suspect node n
to determine who might have seen the same content request. By following the same pro -
tocol as above, the attacking party can then start identifying the whole set of nodes that
have seen the same request.
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To identify the originator of the request from the whole set of nodes that have seen the
request is actually a challenge, because Freenet nodes do not associate any sort of
timestamp with the UIDs, so it is not clear in which order nodes have seen the request.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 describe some different scenarios on how the same content request
might travel between two nodes A and B in the set of nodes that have seen the request.
In figure 2, B has seen the request because A has directly forwarded the request to him.
However, in figure 3 we see that the path might also become convoluted in the sense
that the request has backtracked from B back to A, possibly after B had forwarded the
query to other nodes first. Moreover, figure 4 illustrates the case where A and B have
had no direct contact with each other. The problem becomes apparent when considering
the scenario in which A and B are neighbours, but A hasn't forwarded the request to B,
but rather B has seen and stored the UID because some other node X has forwarded the
query to it. The traceback is done through the reverse path, that is the path the query has
travelled down through the network walked in reverse. Problems arise in scenarios like
the one depicted in figure 4, where the traceback path is non-linear, meaning that there
are at least two different forks in the path, which would be the case in figure 4, given
that A and B are also neighbours. However, it turns out that Freenet has a tendency to
produce linear reverse paths [TBD03].
The originating machine can be found utilizing some lemmas about the Freenet net -
working. First, when a reverse path exists between nodes a and b and the path is of
length two, then b must always be the originator. Second, on a linear reverse path, a
backtrack can occur only once on a corresponding forwarding path, meaning that the
same path cannot contain more than one occurrence of a backtrack. Third, given a linear
Figure 2. A forwards the content 
request to B.
Figure 3. A forwards the request 
to B, but the request backtracks.
Figure 4. No direct 
communication happens between 
A and B.
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reverse path nm → … → nk+1 → nk → nk-1 → … → n0 it stands that nk cannot have initi-
ated a traceback to nk-1 if the distance from nk+1 to nm is less than the distance from nk-1 to
nm, meaning that on the original forwarding path the distance to n 0, even though back-
tracking would occur, is still getting smaller by each hop. Fourth lemma states that if for
every node nk on a linear reverse path of nm → … → nk+1 → nk → nk-1 → … → n0 it
holds that the distance between nk+1 and n0 is less than the distance between n k-1 and n0,
then n0 must be the originator of the request. Finally, if a linear reverse path n m → … →
nk+1 → nk → nk-1 → … → n1 → n0 exists, n0 is the originator of the request, if n1 has at
least one neighbour n who has not seen the UID of the message and it is true that the
distance to nm is less from the node n than it is from n0 [TBD03]. Put together, these
lemmas enable a malicious observer to identify a request's originator with certainty, al -
though the process is somewhat cumbersome and requires the attacker to put up
multiple observation nodes, which could end up being a somewhat lengthy process for
even one node.
4.3 GNUnet
One of the examples of anonymous file sharing, and building on Freenet's lessons
learned, GNUnet attempts to offer anonymity by making sure that no node within the
network knows exactly what they are serving. This is achieved by splitting all data into
small, encrypted chunks that are spread over the network and are searchable via queries
that incorporate natural language to some degree [BGT02]. Searches pertain to keys that
have been defined for the data upon insertion by the inserting user. Distributing file
chunks across the whole network also helps with overall load per node, even though it
means that retrieving complete data requires cooperation from a multitude of nodes. 
The goals of GNUnet are the deniability of participants, fault-tolerant distribution of
content and efficient usage of bandwidth and storage space of participating nodes. Here,
deniability of participants mean that each node can claim they are not in possession of
some piece of data but are merely routing it. The creators of GNUnet have additionally
decided to set efficient usage of bandwidth as a goal, because the design of GNUnet
means that reconstruction of data that has been input into the network requires a lot of
traffic. 
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4.3.1 Overview of functionality
When joining the network, each node chooses a pair of keys, one for identification and
authentication of the node itself, the other for encrypting the communication between
nodes. In order to hide which nodes are communicating with each other, the nodes use a
MIX-like approach: nodes are treated as intermediaries that send messages to other
nodes, but are not allowed to know the contents [Cha81, Kug03].
When data is first inserted into the system, it is split into 1 kilobit (kb) blocks, because
GNUnet operates in fixed size files optimized for the transfer protocol of choice, UDP,
when compulsory protocol headers are added to the payload the size of 1 kb. The user
provides arbitrary keys K, that can be derived from natural language, plus a description
of the content [BGT02]. Data is divided into three different block types, the Data Block
(DBlock), Indirection Blocks (IBlocks) and Root Blocks (RBlocks). The file under in-
sertion becomes split into multiple DBlocks, to which IBlocks then point as a kind of
instruction on how to reconstruct the original file, and finally the RBlocks are the
searchable root blocks containing descriptions and metadata of the file [Kug03].
When a file has been split into DBlocks Di, they are hashed with a one-way hashing
function, yielding H(Di). Then an IBlock-tree is formed recursively, in which every
block contains knowledge of how to find the blocks under it in the tree, which will
eventually lead into the DBlocks. This information is called a query hash. In addition to
the query hashes, each IBlock will also contain superhash, a hash of the concatenation
of all query hashes below this IBlock in the tree structure [Kug03]. Every block B i, in-
cluding H(Di) mentioned earlier, is encrypted with its own content's hash value, which
yields then EH ( Bi ) (Bi ) and is stored under the name of H ( EH (Bi ) (Bi ) ) . Therefore,
one query hash within an IBlock is a pair of (H (Bi) ,H (EH (Bi )(Bi ) ) ) . As the final
step, the RBlock is generated. The RBlock, as stated before, will contain the metadata,
such as file length, data's description, a checksum and a signature value. For every K j
the user has provided, the RBlock R will be encrypted to EH (K j ) (R ) . Both the en-
crypted RBlock and H(H(Kj)) are then stored under the name of H(H(H(K j))) [Kug03,
BGT02].
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The splitting of files is done in order to make sure that no node has to bear unnecessar -
ily high burdens in terms of bandwidth or storage space. It is hard to find a node willing
to spend lots of storage space to store files that are the size of mega- or gigabytes. Even
if they would be willing to spend the storage space, seeing as how cheap storage is
nowadays, the worse problem would be encountered at the moment someone would
want to download that file. Keeping in mind that GNUnet nodes mostly run in people's
private networks, having to commit the bandwidth necessary to transmit a file of that
size would certainly deter possible network participants. 
Retrieving content that has been inserted into the network utilizes the knowledge of how
and under what name the data is stored. We already know that the name the data is
stored under is the block's data hashed twice. Because the hash function used should be
a one-way function, the nodes transmitting the data cannot obtain knowledge of the data
they are transmitting [BGT02, Kug03]. The first step in retrieving data from GNUnet is
to discover the RBlocks pertaining to the file, by forming a search query by keywords
Kj that are triplehashed to form H(H(H(Kj))). If a node has the RBlock stored under that
hash function, it will respond with the encrypted RBlock EH (K j ) (R) and the H(H(Kj))
as proof that the node has the RBlock stored under the specific keyword. Note that the
node that issued the query is able to decrypt the response by using H(K j). No other node
is able to get knowledge of the data being transmitted except through knowledge of the
specific keyword K, or by being in possession of the RBlock and being able to thus
match EH (K j ) (R) . Although theoretically a dictionary attack could then be possible to
quess the value of K, the threat can be mitigated by properly choosing K and basically
treating it as the same as a password for the data [Kug03, BGT02]. Querying by boolean
queries of the form a AND b is also possible, leading to only those RBlocks that match
both keywords to be returned. Storage usage is not impacted by a lot, since this only
leads to one extra RBlock per keyword being generated [BGT02].
After the RBlock has been found, the searching node can issue a download order for the
root IBlock using the query hash within the RBlock. Decrypting the root IBlock will
yield query hashes of the other IBlocks that are also then downloadable and so on, until
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finally the DBlocks are downloaded and decrypted using the information within the IB -
locks.
 We now see that there are two different types of queries within the GNUnet: search and
download queries. Both of these query types contain additional values that can be con-
sidered as headers or metadata for the query itself. These are the return address, the
priority of the query and a time-to-live (TTL) value. Each node operates its own, separ -
ate message queues for every single neighbouring node it has. When a query has to be
sent to one of those nodes, it is instead stored in the queue for that neighbour. Each
queue is flushed at random intervals, meaning that all the messages in that queue are
sent to the node the queue represents [Kug03]. 
When a query is received, the node first checks whether the requested block is found
locally. If this is the case, a response of the form outlined before is put into the queue
corresponding to the return address in the query. If the query was a search query, and if
the content was not locally available, the query is sent to other neighbouring nodes by
randomly selecting n neighbours, where the size of n is dependant on the priority of the
query. The query's priority is then adjusted to be
p
n+1
where p is the old priority of the
message and n is the number of nodes selected to receive the message next. Addition-
ally, the node can exchange the return address to be its own address, in which case it
will store the query to its own routing table, making it able to route the message back -
wards to its source when a response arrives [Kug03].
The anonymous nature of GNUnet comes from the network giving them deniability for
each query. Each node within GNUnet has the ability to claim indirection for any query,
meaning they can claim that they are not the original source of the query, but rather they
have simply exchanged their own address for the return address of the query in ques-
tion, like it was described previously. Figures 5 and 6 describe two scenarios in which a
query is first not indirected by the node B and then is indirected, respectively. Claiming
indirection understandably offers anonymity to each node within the network, since all
nodes can claim indirection when faced with any queries about the data it has sup -
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posedly been downloading. Indirection in GNUnet is based on node's current load and a
random factor in order to throw off any guesses about whether indirection has happened
[BGT02].
However, like it was stated before, nodes are not required and do not necessarily always
indirect queries they receive. This leads to a serious revelation. If a node N never indir-
ects any queries, then any and all queries that have the return address of N are sure to be
originated from N and thus there is no deniability for N. From this we come to under -
stand that in order for a node to achieve deniability and thus anonymity within GNUnet
it has to indirect at least some sufficient number of queries [BGT02].
Figure 5. No indirection happens at B.     Figure 6. B indirects the request from A.
4.3.2 Effectiveness against traffic analysis
In the case of GNUnet, traffic analysis will require nodes within the network. We will
assign them the mission of gaining as much knowledge as possible about the network
and the nodes within it, and then see what methods are possible for them to gain this
knowledge. Since we know that GNUnet is a file-sharing network and run on applica -
tion-level, we can discount port analysis techniques because they would not reveal
















Due to strong encryption of content, and the deniability GNUnet offers to its nodes, ma -
chine learning techniques employed on an observer outside of the network would not
suffice either, because even though the IP packets would reveal the destination and
source addresses of GNUnet nodes, indirection offers the level of anonymity in which
no outside observer can be certain about whether an IP packet from A to B actually
means A and B are communicating with each other in any meaningful way, or whether
in reality another node C wants to communicate with B and A just happened to be the
node to reroute the query C sent. 
In order for an agent to gain any tactile information about GNUnet's network and its
nodes, it would have to have its own node join the network and attempt to somehow
gain information about the data moving through there. We call these kinds of nodes that
are in the network only to gain information about the network and its participants
against their will malicious. 
The first step that a malicious node needs to take, is to gain knowledge of some of the
content within the network. Due to encryption of everything moving through every
node, it is impossible to get information about the data being moved without being able
to decrypt the blocks somehow. By having the malicious node query the network for a
set of data pertaining to predefined, interesting keywords, the node gains knowledge of
the encrypted RBlocks, and is able to decrypt them, and thus can also download all the
IBlocks and DBlocks. So far nothing malicious has been done, the malicious node has
only used GNUnet in the manner it was meant to be used, as a file sharing network, but
the node has now gained the ability to observe all queries containing one of the prepared
keywords, all queries for any of the I- or DBlocks it has itself queried for, and any and
all responses for those I- or DBlocks, because it has itself calculated the hashes for
those keywords and blocks and is thus able to decrypt any messages that contain those
blocks or keywords [Kug03, THS05]. From this it follows, that any nodes within
GNUnet that do not turn up in the monitored data traffic, can be eliminated from the an -
onymity set [BPS01]. So only by downloading block data and monitoring the GNUnet
traffic for similar data traffic, we can already start limiting the anonymity of nodes.
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A method dubbed “The Shortcut Attack” utilizes the fact that even though there is some
random variance in when queries get indirected, the process is still somewhat determin-
istic. When a node has a lot of resources to spend, it will indirect a query, and forward it
when it is sufficiently stressed. Queries can also get dropped if a node is extremely
busy. This behaviour is what is called the shortcut and it is not supposed to hurt an-
onymity of other nodes in the network, since we have just shown that a node can only
hurt its own anonymity by never indirecting queries. In short, the shortcut attack aims to
make a node forward queries instead of indirecting them in order for a malicious node
to gain knowledge of the query's initiator [Kug03, THS05]. This is achieved by flooding
a node with high priority queries, thus increasing the node's load and making it favour
forwarding queries as opposed to indirecting them. By forwarding queries to the mali -
cious node, the node is exposing the initiator of the query to the malicious node doing
traffic analysis [Kug03]. 
The weakness of this shortcut attack is that the attacker has no way of making sure,
what queries are being forwarded. Keeping in mind that the node under attack might be
connected to at least hundreds of other nodes, the possibility of the malicious node get-
ting a query he's interested in getting forwarded to him, is pretty small. The attack
method would be more efficient if routes in the network were more static, but since they
are not, the need to flood the attacked node with queries needs to be removed [Kug03].
In the improved shortcut attack the malicious node will approximate that a node A is
close to the initiator than the node B. In this case, even if the malicious node receives an
indirected query from B, that originates from A, the malicious node can simply respond
straight away to A. If the malicious node has quessed correctly, it is providing valid con-
tent to A and possibly attracting even more queries straight from A itself. This
possibility is even increased in the event that B is unable to respond to A's query
without the help of the malicious node, which is never going to come [Kug03]. Now, if
A is the initiator, the attack has successfully determined who is communicating queries
outward. Of course, this improvement on the shortcut attack requires some knowledge
of the network's topology, but when that knowledge is present, the malicious node can
find the initiator by next connecting to A's neighbours and waiting for the content it is
interested in. By way of statistical testing it can then determine whether a new node is
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closer to the initiator or whether it is not, which indicates A as the initiator of the query.
With the basic routing mechanism of GNUnet – that is, random – the lower bound for








, where Prnd is the equal probability for a node to be selected as the
target to forward or indirect a query to, m is the selected set of nodes from k neighbours
and l is the distance of the attacker to the initiator [THS05, Kug03]. 
4.4 Onion routing
When aiming for anonymous connections in the sense that no other party has any know -
ledge of who is communicating with whom, a technique called onion routing has been
regarded as a successful technique. In it, an initiating node, the first node contacted by
the sender of the message, determines a route to the recipient node through the net -
work's different nodes and forms an onion that it sends through that route in order to
establish a circuit, a kind of semi-permanent communication channel between the two
endpoints. The term onion refers to the object being sent, because it is encrypted with
layers, with the outmost layer being decryptable by the next receiving node, and the
payload being the next encrypted layer and the next node's id in the network [GRS96,
GRS99, SGR97]. Only for the receiver's node will the payload be the actual message.
From this it follows that after the initiator node, a normal forwarding node only has in -
formation about the immediately preceding node and the immediately following node.
The process of choosing nodes into the circuit based on their routing to the destination
is left out of this chapter, since that process is more implementation-specific and does
not have a general model like the process of onion routing does.
In case a malicious agent tries to determine information from the length of the remain -
ing route, a random string the size of the layer being peeled off is added as padding to
the payload for the next node at each hop. Alternatively, the padding can be performed
for each layer of the onion at the initial node so that for each receiving node, the pay -
load has the size of a full onion, as though the node was the first one to receive it. This
method is based on the fact that onions are defined as having constant size [GRS96].
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Excluding the details of the actual payload's format, a layer of the onion should have at
least this information contained within it: Expiration time, next hop id, cryptographic
operations and keys to be performed for the payload when messages are being routed
from the original sender to receiver, cryptographic operations and keys to be performed
for the payload when messages are being routed from the original receiver to the sender,
and the payload in some format. For every routing node, the payload will look like an -
other complete-sized onion, and for the intended receiver the payload will be the actual
message with the padding we mentioned earlier [GRS96, GRS99]. The expiration timer
is used as a countermeasure for replay attacks, in which someone tries to gain informa -
tion about the network and the communicators by sending the same onion again through
the same circuit. A routing node needs to keep a copy of each onion it receives until the
expiration time is met, so that if the node receives a copy of any onion it already has, it
simply discards it. Same goes for onions that have expiry timers already met, those are
discarded straight away as well [GRS96, SGR97].
It is also possible that the originating node does not know the full route to the recipient.
It's not necessary either, and in some cases might even be discouraged in order to add
more hops to the circuit's chain. In these cases, or in a case there is a connection change
of which the initiator is unaware, a technique called loose routing is used [GRS96].
When using loose routing, a maximum loose routing count variable is added to the in -
formation contained in an onion's layer. The router that makes the decision to employ
loose routing then acts as a kind of secondary initial node, making the received, part-
way routed onion in its entirety a new payload, and forming a new onion with layers at
most the amount specified in the maximum loose routing variable mentioned earlier. Of
course, this could conflict with the demand for fixed size onions, so the original sender's
node needs to take this into account when doing the initial padding and data operations
to the onion [GRS96]. 
4.5 Tor network
Building on the onion routing paradigm introduced in the previous chapter, the Tor net-
work (Tor) is a so-called second generation onion router. Being an anonymous overlay
network, it too aims to conceal the identities of people participating in the network, but
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unlike our other examples which are primarily used for data storage and sharing, Tor is
primed for concealing communication itself. That is, Tor specifically tries to provide
source anonymity for communicating partners, making it impossible for listeners to find
out, who is communicating with whom [DMS04].
When designing Tor, the developers have chosen several different design goals for the
network. First, the system needs to be easily deployable, meaning that running a Tor
node can not be too expensive for the user, nor be difficult to implement by requiring a
lot of custom patching of your operating system. Second, because an anonymous system
requires a solid user base in order for it to reliably hide user interactions, Tor needs to be
easy to install and use on any operating system, and not require much configuration in
order to get it working. It is important to note that the aforementioned large user base is
not only a design goal, it is a security requirement as well [ADS03, BMS01]. Third, the
platform needs to be independent enough to serve as a potential testbed for future re-
search into open problems in low-latency anonymous networks, like protection from
Sybil attacks. Fourth, the end product’s design needs to be simple and well understood,
in order for Tor to be extensible with additional features without imposing too much of a
cost on readability and deployability [DMS04].
4.5.1  Overview of functionality
Like other anonymous overlay networks we have discussed in this section, Tor is a user-
level application as well, running with no special privileges. When speaking about the
functionality of the platform, two distinct terms need to be made clear from the start:
Onion Proxies (OPs), are user-run local softwares that are their connection to the net-
work, used to handle connections from other user applications, fetch directories etc.
Onion Routers (ORs) are the processes operating within the network, relaying data and
connecting to requested destinations [DMS04].
ORs maintain two keys: one for long-term identification, meaning that it is used to sign
TLS-certificates for communicating between different ORs, and signing the OR’s own
descriptor, containing its keys, address, bandwidth and other such information. The
other key is for handling the OR’s onions, key negotiation and decrypting circuit re-
quests that are incoming from different users. Additionally, as a part of the TLS
45
communication protocol, a link key is generated, but these are rotated periodically and
independently from other keys by the OR, in order to mitigate the damage a comprom-
ised key could generate [DMS04, DiA99]. 
When talking about communication in Tor, it is important to remember that the data
transmission adheres to what was discussed in section 4.4 in general. When reading
through this chapter, it is therefore important to note that even though we do not expli-
citly bring up the onion routing scheme or the act of circuit building, the same
principles are still in effect.
Next, we are going to take a look at how a circuit is built in Tor. In that discussion we
will omit the step wherein an OP decides on the exact nodes to which it will relay mes -
sages. Therefore, we deem it appropriate to at this point concisely discuss this fact. Tor
uses some small number of known ORs that act as directory servers. These directory
servers track network topology and node states, including their keys, and make this in -
formation available through their own HTTP servers. The directory servers share this
information between themselves, and other ORs periodically publish their own informa -
tion to these directory servers, in order for each directory server to have a uniform view
of the network. What this means for OPs is that they can contact these directory servers
in order to get knowledge of the network around them and start building a circuit
[DMS04]. 
ORs communicate with 512 byte fixed-size cells. These cells consist of a header and a
payload, where the header carries a circuit identifier, and a command that describes how
the receiving OR should treat the cell payload. The circuit identifier is a some form of
unique ID that corresponds to one circuit, which is necessary because a single TLS con-
nection can carry data from several different circuits [DMS04]. Additionally, the
identifier is connection specific, meaning that each OP/OR or OR/OR -hop carries its
own circuit identifier, but nevertheless they will still correspond to a particular circuit.
Cells can be either control cells or relay cells, based on the command provided in the
cell’s headers. Control cells are always intended and interpreted for the receiving node,
and they carry one of possible commands: padding commands are used to keep a con-
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nection alive or pad a link; create or created commands are used for establishing a new
circuit and acknowledging the creation, respectively; destroy, which is used to remove
an existing circuit altogether. 
By comparison, relay cells are used for end-to-end communication and are decorated
with an additional relay header at the beginning the payload. The relay header fulfils a
very similar purpose to the cell header, carrying stream identification, checksums for
payload integrity checking, payload length information and a relay command. The pos-
sible values of a relay command are: relay data, which is used for moving data from the
sender to the recipient down the communication stream; relay begin or end which in-
structs the nodes to begin or shut down a stream, respectively; relay teardown is used
when relay end is not possible, meaning the stream has broken and needs to be shut
down; relay connected is used to notify the OP that a relay begin command has success-
fully completed; relay extend and extended are used to bring another node into the
communication circuit and to acknowledge the completion of such an operation; relay
truncate and truncated are then used correspondingly to drop a part of the circuit’s parti -
cipating nodes; relay sendme, which is used for congestion control; and finally relay
drop, used to implement long-range dummy messages [DMS04].
To begin constructing a circuit, a user’s OP starts by sending a create command cell to
the first chosen node on the path. The payload of the create cell is an encrypted hand -
shake, the key used being the onion key of the receiving OR. The OR then responds
with the created command cell, with a payload that contains the negotiated key that is
based on the initial handshake. The initiating user now has a circuit with the length of
one hop [DMS04].
In order to get a bigger circuit, the OP issues a relay cell with the command relay extend
to the first OR. For this relay cell, the payload is a new encrypted handshake and the
identity of the next OR. The first receiving OR then issues a create command cell to the
OR specified in the initial message, and passes the encrypted handshake along to the
control cell. The created response control cell from the newest OR in the circuit is then
wrapped to the relay extended relay cell by the first OR and passed back along the cir -
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cuit to the OP. Every subsequent extension to the circuit follows the same method
[DMS04, SGR97]. In the end, the original user has constructed a circuit with perfect
unilateral entity authentication, because the OP knows for whom the handshake is made,
but since no public key signing is used, the ORs have no knowledge of from where the
handshake actually originates. Furthermore, because the encryption key is decided
between the first OR and the OP, unilateral key authentication is also established
[DMS04, SGR97]. 
When the OP wants to communicate with another OP, it first needs to select a circuit to
use the communication for. It can either choose one of the pre existing ones, or then
construct a new one altogether, and then designate one of the nodes on the circuit to be
the exit node. The exit node is a crucial node in the circuit, since it is the only one that
will gain knowledge of the intended recipient of the message being transmitted, and it
can be chosen to be any node within the circuit, though usually the last one [DMS04].
When the circuit and the exit node have been selected, the initiator OP will send a relay
begin cell to the exit node, specifying the recipient OP in the payload. Upon the exit
node successfully connecting to the recipient, the exit node will send a relay connected
notification cell to the OP, and the stream is then ready to transmit data, which is pack -
aged into relay data cells. Closing a stream is analogous closing a TCP stream, the OP
sends a relay end cell and gets a relay end cell in response, after which the stream has
successfully been closed. In the event of an error or a broken stream, the adjacent node
which notices the problem will send a relay teardown cell [DMS04]. 
4.5.2 Effectiveness against traffic analysis
Like in other anonymous overlay networks, it is not feasible to consider scenarios,
where an attacker or adversary has global control over the whole overlay network. It is
easy to understand that when somebody has total control over the entirety of a network,
that entity can trivially get all the knowledge required to identify all the traffic in the
network. Therefore, Tor aims to provide protection against an entity that can gain partial
control of the network [DMS04, MDM05].
In Tor’s model of routing data, one OR is of significant value when considering ramific-
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ations for anonymity. The exit node from a circuit is always in a special position, be -
cause it gains the knowledge of the intended recipient for a particular message.
Therefore, if the exit node happens to be malicious, it gains at least some knowledge of
the communicating partners. Remember, that because Tor is a volunteer-network, it is
trivial for a malicious user to install the required software and join the network with
multiple nodes. Even though we cannot assume that this same user will have control
over all of the Tor network, we can for the purposes of this analysis assume that he can
plausibly have a node in any position of the network or a particular circuit.
Attacks against Tor can be categorized into two different types, which are analogous to
the traffic analysis types we have discussed earlier. A traffic analysis attack can be either
passive or active. Passive attacks against Tor’s anonymity usually mean that malicious
nodes gather information about communication patterns and try to single out relevant
data from the patterns or usage of certain circuits. However, because several streams can
share one circuit, and due to cell contents being encrypted, passive attacks will be hard
to enact and would require a lot of processing of encrypted stream data, trying to find
the similarities in one OPs outbound traffic and another’s inbound traffic over a long
period of time [DMS04, LLY09]. 
By contrast, active attacks focus on watermarking the traffic, somehow making it distin -
guishable from all other communication flowing through the network. An example of
such an attack could be an OR that slightly changes the timing interval of cells when
transmitting them forward, and then attempting to correlate that same interval on the re -
ceiving end [LLY09]. 
The above watermarking technique can be used to achieve some form of traffic identi-
fication by a modestly equipped attacker. In one effective form of attack, the attacking
entity needs a tor node of his own as well as a web server under his control, serving a
website somebody connects to. The prerequisites are directly analogous to a situation
where a Tor user wants to anonymously connect to some website being controlled by a
corporation or some other entity that has an interest in breaking that anonymity and gain
information about users connecting to their site.
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In the attack, the attacker configures his web server to send packets in a predetermined
pattern. The pattern itself is going to be the watermark that he will attempt to follow
through the network. The corrupt tor node will be used for tracking. It is possible to
configure your own node to construct circuits that are only one hop in length, meaning
that they only connect to one other node. By configuring the attacker's node in this way,
he gains the ability to follow any one particular node, by flooding the only other node in
the circuit with probe traffic that measures the latency of the connection, and therefore
gives an estimate on the load of the target Tor node [MDM04]. So the attacker will
therefore send data in a particular pattern from his malicious web server, then flood a
target Tor node with probe traffic to get information on the latency the probe traffic re -
ceives, then try to match that latency pattern with the particular sending pattern of the
web server.  This attack pattern seems to be reliable and pervasive and clearly breaches
some of the anonymity in Tor, because it degrades the anonymity of a node into being
basically just a normal proxy server [MDM04].
4.6 Summary
This section has provided some insight into anonymous overlay networks. In the intro-
ductory part, we briefly discussed some of the more common ways of routing messages
or data along an overlay network, Chord was introduced as an example here. We then
introduced some basic functionality of three somewhat popular anonymous overlay net-
works, GNUnet, Freenet and the Tor network. For each of these networks we showed
how they try to ensure anonymity for their users, which was mainly through different
encryption schemes and mechanisms for obfuscating the traffic path so that an observer
would not be able to tell the real originator of a given message. However, we also found
out that there are ways for a persistent attacker to gain some information about the net -
work's users on every platform. Of course, academic papers and the realities of traffic
analysis do not necessarily meet at each turn, so even though a network's anonymity
model might get breached under certain conditions, it does not automatically mean that
the anonymity of all of a network's users is in peril.
On a larger scale, traffic analysis and user identification on the internet is a very large
area of different technologies, methods and attacks on a lot of different platforms. Even
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though an anonymous overlay network might tackle some of the problems and offer an
increased level of anonymity against traffic analysis techniques, there are still ways in
which a person might get identified, for example through canvassing techniques
[Nor16].
5 Case study: Utilization of a Tor relay node
At the moment, one of the foremost anonymous networks on the tongue of people
seems to be the Tor network. The Onionview service lists the number of all Tor relays at
several thousand all around the globe, which at least heavily suggests that Tor as a pro-
ject’s support base is somewhat wide, keeping in mind that the number of relays does
not reveal anything about the number of Onion Proxies, meaning the amount of people
using these relays to more anonymously surf the internet [Oni16]. Hidden services,
which are sites accessible only from within the Tor network, and their popularity also
suggests that even Tor is widely and somewhat regularly used [BPT14]. 
Because of Tor’s perceived popularity, we believed that running a Tor relay and logging
the amount of traffic through it would give some insight to the amount of users and their
geographical distribution. In this section we will be going through the setup of our tor
relay and take a look at the gathered results.
5.1 Setup
We ran the tor relay on a Raspberry Pi, first model type B+, with 512 Megabytes of
RAM and a Broadcom ARM processor BCM2835 with integrated GPU. The choice of
hardware was based on the empirical knowledge of a Raspberry’s stability, and the fact
that running a Tor relay was not going to heavily burden the processor or RAM, espe-
cially with proper throttling of the relay’s bandwidth. Network connectivity was
handled through the author’s own home internet connection, with a static IP allocation
from the ISP. 
The operating system installed on the Raspberry was the Raspbian Jessie, a Debian-
based linux operating system. The Tor relay package is currently available and was in-
stalled through Debian’s package manager apt-get, as well as arm, the command-line
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monitoring and logging tool for the relay itself. Excluding dependencies for the afore -
mentioned packages, no other software was installed for the purposes of this data
gathering case study.
On the configuration side of the relay, we set it up to advertise a bandwidth of 819,2
kilobytes per second, with a burst bandwidth of 1 megabyte per second. Because the
computer was run off the author's own internet connection, which was still in use daily
for other purposes as well, the case study was not to interfere unnecessarily with normal
life. At the same time, almost a megabyte worth of bandwidth nets the relay a “fast” at -
tribute in the atlas.torproject.org online directory, which in turn increases the amount of
clients that want to connect to our relay, meaning that the advertised bandwidth should
be enough to guarantee meaningful amounts of traffic.
For every relay, there is the option to specify in the configurations that the relay will
also work as an exit node. What it means is that an OP is allowed to designate that node
in the circuit as the one that will submit the message to the recipient OP. However, we
opted out of this possibility, even though it would offer us insights on what kind of ser -
vices Tor users might connect to. The reason is, that if the traffic was malicious or
illegal, and it was being followed, the traffic would seem to be originating from the au -
thor's personal connection, and it could possibly lead to legal ramifications, which was
not something we would be willing to risk. 
For logging, we deemed that using the logging offered by Tor itself was going to be suf -
ficient. After all, we scoped this as a case study and therefore were not aiming at doing
any special inspections of our relay's traffic. Tor offers the ability to log on three differ-
ent levels of severity, debug, notice and error. Debug logs would log everything the
relay was doing, and in so doing expose some aspects of our relay that a malicious en -
tity could perhaps use for its own purposes. The notice level offers the level of logging
we felt was the most useful: Through it, the software writes periodically a so-called
heartbeat information to disk, containing the uptime, amount of circuits the relay is a
part of, the amount of traffic sent and received, and the number of handshakes for cir -
cuits received and successfully completed. Tor network currently uses two different
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protocols for handshakes, the TAP and Ntor protocols, which are both logged separately.
In a separate file, the software would track connections by country, based on the geoIP
of a packet. These written logs were then backed up through rsyncing to an external
hard drive in case the Raspberry Pi would suffer some form of breakdown or otherwise
lose the logs.
5.2 Data collection phase
Generally speaking, four different major variables can be identified from the data col-
lected. Those are the number of circuits the relay is operating in, how many handshakes
the relay has received, how much data has been transferred and what is the geographical
distribution of the connections.
We did not have a lot of set expectations for the case study, mainly because the case
study was conducted without much prior knowledge about the inner workings of Tor.
Starting the case study, we assumed that the relay would receive and send data some -
where around 500 gigabytes during the data collection phase. Additionally, due to Tor
essentially being a peer-to-peer network and torrent networks quickly garnering connec -
tions from all over the world, we assumed that such would be the case here as well, and
that our data would quickly show that connections had been made from almost every
country in the world.
During the data collection phase, there were two unfortunate complications. Firstly, on
the 8th of March, the Raspberry suffered a power outage for the day. No data for that day
was therefore accumulated and the datapoint closely matches the one from the 7 th of
March.
Additionally, there is an undocumented feature that you are unable to turn off in Tor
software's logging, which causes the program to rotate and overwrite heartbeat logs on a
10-day cycle. Since our redundancy was only for hardware failure and not an unfore -
seen feature like that, this resulted in the loss of all collected heartbeat data from
February to the start of April. The heartbeat logs included the cumulative transferred
data for the uptime period, handshakes and circuits for the uptime period. This feature
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affected the data collection in that data gathering was turned off on the 17 th of April and
the absence of data was not noticed and consequently logging turned back on until the
19th, resulting in a gap from 17th of April to the 20th of April. However, the entry statist-
ics were intact through the whole data collection period.
5.3 Results
Like previously stated, the Tor software by default offers us four distinct measures by
which to gain insight into our relay’s popularity and therefore allowing us to extrapolate
the popularity of the network to some extent. We will be introducing those results one
by one.
For building circuits, Tor sends specific handshake-messages to relays, which are equi-
valent to the create control messages specified in section 4.5.. These two different types
of protocols are the TAP protocol and NTor protocol, of which the latter is the more
modern version and the former is deprecated and mostly used by some bots operating
within the network [How13]. Our node successfully served just about every handshake
request, failing handshakes total being seven for the data collection period. Since this
number is so low, it probably indicates that the handshake process was terminated by
the client OPs before they could be processed properly by our node. Figure 7 shows the
fluctuation of received handshakes during the data collection period, the complete col -
lected data is available as attachment 1. In total, the number of completed handshakes
per protocol is 116 983 for TAP protocol and 386 082 for the NTor protocol, out of a
total of 116 985 and 386 087 respectively. Considering that on 2013 the number of Tor
users was nearing four million, half a million handshakes processed in the year 2016 for
a somewhat slow relay in Finland seems to be on par with expectations [How13].
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Figure 7. Number of completed handshakes in the two different protocols.
Figure 7 shows the number of completed handshakes, which essentially is the amount of
circuit creation requests our node has received. An OP has multiple circuits from which
it selects one with sufficiently small amount of load at the time to send a message
through. Circuits can be torn down at the behest of OPs at basically any time, meaning
that the number of circuits a relay is a part of will never be as high as the amount of
completed handshakes. However, based on the number of handshakes, it would stand to
reason that active circuits should number in somewhere in the early thousands at the
very leasts.
In actuality, the number of circuits our node was handling simultaneously seems to re -
volve around the 300 circuits mark. Figure 8 shows that the maximum number of
circuits achieved has been 400, and the minimum 186. The complete data is available as
attachment 2. The low number of circuits compared to the extremely high number of
handshakes does seem to indicate that either there is a great number of circuit teardowns
























Figure 8. Number of active circuits at the time of writing heartbeat information to disk.
believe that circuits are at least semi-valuable to form due to the encryptions required, it
would stand to reason that they were not torn down at a very high rate. Teardowns might
happen as a result of the OP rotating circuits due to a specific encryption chain having
been in existence for some predetermined amount of time and thus having been deemed
as more vulnerable to malicious attacks. Computer resources could also be a substantial
variable in the amount of circuits our relay can simultaneously be a part of, but we have
not gathered any data on system load during this case study and therefore cannot theor -
ize on this further with any substantial evidence to back us up. 
We have now seen that our somewhat meagre relay has received a huge number of
handshakes and served at best as a part of almost half a thousand circuits. The next im -
portant and interesting measurement is no doubt the amount of data sent through those
circuits. Unfortunately Tor does not keep track of traffic per circuit, as it would be a
new piece of information a malicious entity might use to distinguish nodes in circuits.
The amount of traffic sent and received is cumulative for the entirety of the node’s up-
time, meaning in our case that our traffic amount is accumulated from 8 th of April
forwards. By the end of April 25th’s surveillance period our node had sent 621.33 giga-
bytes of data and received 619.59 gigabytes. The increase in data can be seen in figure
9, while the complete collected data can be found as attachment 3.













crudely, what might the total amount of traffic be, calculated from the start of our case
study, February. From the data we can see that between a single six-hour period, the
amount of traffic the node has sent increases by roughly 3 gigabytes. That means that in
a 24-hour period our node sends around 12 gigabytes of data through the Tor network.
Taking into account that this accumulation started on the 9 th of March, 48 days prior,
and that on a rate of 12 GB per day it would have taken almost 52 days to get to the
amount of sent data. This implies that the increase hasn’t been entirely linear, but some -
where outside of our data there has been a burst of traffic. What is more, since our relay
has been turned on the 11th of February, and therefore our uptime has been 74 days, ex -
cluding the day power was lost to the machine, We can very roughly estimate that our
total bandwidth has been somewhere around the 1 Terabyte mark. 
Figure 9. Accumulation of sent and received traffic over data collection period.
Finally, our data on the geographical spread of connections to our relay is set into per-
spective due to the insight into overall popularity of our node. All in all, it turns out that
our relay processed connections from 58 countries geographically, from America to Ja-
pan. Total number of connections was 232 010, roughly equating to 46% of all






















Figure 10. Connections from the top three countries by number of connections on a single day.
Figure 10 shows how the number of connections fluctuates for three countries that had
the three highest amounts of connections on a single day. As is clearly evident, connec -
tions fluctuate highly on a daily basis, making it reasonably clear that OPs perform
circuit teardowns far more frequently than what we assumed at first from the description
of a circuit as a logical structure. More than that, there seems to be no pattern or reason
behind the fact that the amount of connections fluctuates so wildly for a given country.
What we can only verify from this is the fact that there does not seem to be much coher -
ence behind the decision-making when an OP forms a new circuit, at least in the sense
that it would reuse the same nodes often or frequently. 
Turning our attention to the countries themselves, the most often connected country is
Slovenia by 864 connections during the data collection period, followed by Japan at 800
connections and at third place both Hungary and Slovakia at 768 connections. Japan is a
bit of surprise, as a somewhat liberal country you would not exactly expect there to be a
need for anonymity services. Then again, Finland, a western liberal and democratic
country also features on our connected countries list with 688 connections on the 15 th of























roots and connections to Russia, and generally thought of as not as liberal and progress-
ive as many other European countries. It is believable that in those countries citizens
and for example journalists would have more reason to hide their internet usage pat-
terns.
5.4 Summary
In this section we have introduced the case study in which we tried to ascertain the pop-
ularity of the Tor network. As such, we ran a Tor relay without exit node capabilities
from February to April, but unfortunately due to various difficulties lost most of the
gathered data, including the data amounts transferred, handshakes processed and circuits
our relay had been a part of, from February to early April. However, the number of con-
nections our relay has received remained intact and complete all the way from February
to April and the end of our data collection period.
Our data showed that even with just a little bit of computing power and memory, and 1
megabyte of burst bandwidth, our relay constantly saw traffic, relaying in total over one
terabyte from 12th to 25th of April as sent and received data. On average our relay had
3461 connections from up to 57 distinct countries, with some connections being from
countries the logging system was unable to identify,  on a daily basis. While the number
of different countries is not as high as one would expect from a traditional peer-to-peer
network, to us it seems evident that Tor as a network is popular and ready to utilize even
meagre new resources that become available. In this sense, we deem our case study a
success. 
6 Conclusion
This thesis’ core has dealt with the problem traffic analysis presents for anonymity, one
of the cornerstones of the current internet paradigm, and anonymous overlay networks,
one kind of answer for the same problem. The act of traffic analysis, even though ori-
ginally meant for monitoring the network health and status for problems like congestion
or failing hardware. However, due to largely commercial interests, the term now refers
more to the act of identifying specific applications from data traffic, and using this
knowledge to identify and track individual internet users. This presents a problem for
people that have any reason to hide their identities. There is of course an ethical debate
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to be had about whether or not legally sound reasons for hiding one’s identity trump the
illegal or morally questionable ones, or whether commercial interests should be enough
to start undermining this anonymity. The fact remains that traffic analysis can be and is
largely used in todays internet, and that either as the intended or a side product, it is af-
fecting the anonymity of internet users.
In order for the reader to understand how traffic analysis can be performed, it is first ne -
cessary to get acquainted with the mechanics of traditional IP network routing.
Therefore, the first section of our thesis is aimed to show, how a network device will
forward a packet from the sender to the recipient, starting from the routing table and
how the device will refer to it and chooses the next target. Building on that, we then in -
troduce other effecting factors, like Autonomous Systems and briefly touch the subject
of prioritizing specific subnets or ASes over some others because of monetary reasons,
namely the owner of the subnet using traffic analysis techniques to identify and bill cer -
tain traffic. After reading the section, we hope that the reader will have a solid
understanding of how traffic flows through the network to its intended recipients and
how this normal model for traffic might constitute a problem for anonymity.
After gaining sufficient knowledge of the normal packet forwarding procedure, the tech-
niques traditionally used in traffic analysis are discussed. In nowadays internet, with all
the emerging new protocols and applications that use non-standardized ports as their
communication ports, it has become the norm for traffic analysis to be centred on ana-
lyzing and identifying certain traffic patterns to be belonging to certain type of traffic.
However, this same technique can be used to single out specific users connecting to a
site under surveillance. After introducing the different mechanisms of traffic analysis,
we briefly discuss the implications on privacy, most notably the fact that after big re -
veals of breaches on anonymity, such as Edward Snowden’s revelation, a lot of people
start censoring their own behaviour on the internet, even though they might not be doing
anything inherently illegal. In that sense we think we have clearly demonstrated the fact
that fear of surveillance already affects all people, whether they have reason to fear or
not. As such, the implication that traffic analysis has – in addition to an impact on an -
onymity –  a negative effect on people’s perception of freedom and behaviour.
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One of the answers for the problem of traffic analysis is the development of anonymous
overlay networks, application-level networks built on top of the IP network, implement -
ing their own logic for routing and forwarding messages. We identified source
anonymity as a sender's expectation that his or her act of messaging will remain an-
onymous in that the partners of the communication will not be revealed to outside
entities and discussed how three different examples of anonymous overlay networks try
to achieve this. We discussed GNUnet, Freenet and the Tor network, and found out that
they each have a distinct aim and definition of anonymity in general. GNUnet and
Freenet are mainly file-sharing platforms, but while GNUnet tries to secure anonymity
by strong encryption strategies, while the developers of Freenet believe that by suffi -
ciently obfuscating who is sharing which file, each user is effectively anonymous,
because they can all claim that they are not the initiator of any specific request. Finally,
the Tor network is more of a communications platform, which utilizes onion routing to
achieve source anonymity, by ensuring that no node in charge of forwarding the mes-
sage, apart from the very last one to forward the message to its intended recipient,
knows the participants in any way. 
We also took a look at what kind of traffic analysis attacks could be and have been util -
ized against every one of these anonymous overlay networks. Being distributed
networks all, if a global attacker is assumed, then anonymity will surely break in every
one of them. After all, if every other node you connect to in a network is malicious and
wants to find out your identity, there is nothing a benevolent entity can do to hide him -
self. However, even excluding the global attacker option, it turns out that the anonymity
in all of our example networks can be compromised to some degree with sufficient ef-
fort, resources and time. As such, none of our examples turned out to be the perfect
solution, but in lieu of one, using an anonymous online network definitely provides a
given user with more anonymity than using the “public” IP network.
Finally, as a case study, we have taken a look at the Tor network's utilization by running
a Tor relay and gathering some data on how many connections it serves and how much
data flows through it, as well as where does that traffic originate from. Remember, that a
tor relay knows from where it receives a message and to where it is supposed to send it
next. We found out, that Tor is in fact heavily used based on the amount of traffic seen
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in just under a month of data, and extrapolating that to the three month period of writing
this thesis. Contrary to our expectation that connections would originate from all over
the world as would be the case in a normal peer-to-peer network. However, it seems like
connections clustered pretty heavily to some nations. Reasons for this could be innu-
merable. Most notably, China is not present in our list of origin countries at all, probably
due to China's Great Firewall's attempt at blocking Tor as an application – again,
through means of traffic analysis and identifying Tor's specific traffic patterns.
Taking a look at our two research questions for this thesis, we wanted to find out firstly
whether GNUnet, Freenet or Tor provides effective means of protection against traffic
analysis methods. For our first research question, the results seem to be inconclusive.
Although they certainly introduce a new layer of security to protect user anonymity, we
have also introduced ways in which traffic analysis methods can be used to breach that
new security with some resources, malicious intent, and some finite amount of time. 
Our second research question asked “Can Tor’s perceived popularity be witnessed from
the viewpoint of a single relay operator as high traffic volume and a large number of
connections?” To verify or disqualify our research question, we ran a tor relay and
logged various measurements on a very limited hardware with very limited bandwidth.
Even though our limitations, the relay ended up receiving and sending in total approx -
imately 1,2 terabytes of data within our collection period, with around half a million
handshakes in the same period and couple of thousand of active connections daily from
various locations around the globe, we feel that our second research question can be
verified.
As a closing note, we would once again like to remind the reader, that traffic analysis,
user surveillance and tracking on the Internet is a large problem domain, and not solv -
able just by one solution, such as the anonymous networks we have just discussed. In
the future, work needs to surely continue on a strong anonymity network, but most
likely it will be enhanced by something like a proxy solution incorporated into the net -
work. Additionally, like always with the subject of network security, the best of
mechanical solutions will not hold, if the user decides to give it up, i.e. by publicly
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identifying himself or allowing himself to be tracked. Such would be the case if the user
would install tracking software on his computer, most probably due to carelessness or
systematic baiting on the behalf of an attacker.
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date TAP completed TAP total NTor completed  NTor total
12.04.2016 07:00 2127 2127 7825 7825
12.04.2016 13:00 2829 2829 8271 8271
12.04.2016 19:00 3123 3123 8519 8519
13.04.2016 01:00 3335 3335 10246 10246
13.04.2016 07:00 2049 2049 8084 8084
13.04.2016 13:00 2487 2487 7913 7913
13.04.2016 19:00 2780 2780 8606 8606
14.04.2016 01:00 2855 2855 8853 8854
14.04.2016 07:00 1841 1841 7276 7276
14.04.2016 13:00 2283 2283 7733 7733
14.04.2016 19:00 3066 3066 9369 9369
15.04.2016 01:00 2876 2876 9396 9396
15.04.2016 07:00 2065 2065 7352 7352
15.04.2016 13:00 2715 2715 7768 7768
15.04.2016 19:00 3384 3384 8657 8657
16.04.2016 01:00 3266 3266 8764 8764
16.04.2016 07:00 1967 1967 7436 7436
16.04.2016 13:00 2422 2422 6975 6975
16.04.2016 19:00 2366 2366 6997 6997
17.04.2016 01:00 1551 1551 4674 4674
17.04.2016 07:00 1127 1127 4650 4650
17.04.2016 13:00 1727 1727 5674 5674
17.04.2016 19:00 2219 2219 6226 6226
20.04.2016 07:00 2018 2018 7239 7239
20.04.2016 13:00 2691 2692 7362 7363
20.04.2016 19:00 2868 2868 7762 7762
21.04.2016 01:00 2851 2851 8482 8482
21.04.2016 07:00 1961 1961 6974 6974
21.04.2016 13:00 2447 2447 7633 7633
21.04.2016 19:00 2874 2874 8210 8210
22.04.2016 01:00 3600 3600 10315 10316
22.04.2016 07:00 2507 2507 8926 8926
22.04.2016 13:00 3051 3051 9894 9895
22.04.2016 19:00 3419 3420 11597 11597
23.04.2016 01:00 2891 2891 10216 10217
23.04.2016 07:00 1860 1860 7625 7625
23.04.2016 13:00 2315 2315 8961 8961
23.04.2016 19:00 3031 3031 9823 9823
24.04.2016 01:00 2760 2760 10391 10391
24.04.2016 07:00 1731 1731 7506 7506
24.04.2016 13:00 1778 1778 7363 7363
24.04.2016 19:00 3060 3060 12172 12172
25.04.2016 01:00 3077 3077 11832 11832
25.04.2016 07:00 2080 2080 8966 8966
25.04.2016 13:00 2654 2654 10048 10048
25.04.2016 19:00 2999 2999 9521 9521





















































12.04.2016 07:00 478.68 477.36
12.04.2016 13:00 481.29 479.97
12.04.2016 19:00 484.76 483.43
13.04.2016 01:00 486.93 485.59
13.04.2016 07:00 489.57 488.22
13.04.2016 13:00 492.25 490.89
13.04.2016 19:00 495.4 494.04
14.04.2016 01:00 497.9 496.54
14.04.2016 07:00 501.22 499.85
14.04.2016 13:00 502.64 501.27
14.04.2016 19:00 504.87 503.49
15.04.2016 01:00 507.53 506.14
15.04.2016 07:00 509.52 508.14
15.04.2016 13:00 511.79 510.39
15.04.2016 19:00 514.38 512.98
16.04.2016 01:00 518.35 516.94
16.04.2016 07:00 521.49 520.06
16.04.2016 13:00 522.88 521.46
16.04.2016 19:00 525.4 523.97
17.04.2016 01:00 526.88 525.44
17.04.2016 07:00 528.35 526.91
17.04.2016 13:00 530.99 529.55
17.04.2016 19:00 533.04 531.59
20.04.2016 07:00 554.66 553.11
20.04.2016 13:00 557.77 556.21
20.04.2016 19:00 560.71 559.15
21.04.2016 01:00 564.64 563.06
21.04.2016 07:00 566.89 565.3
21.04.2016 13:00 570.15 568.55
21.04.2016 19:00 572.84 571.24
22.04.2016 01:00 576.12 574.51
22.04.2016 07:00 579.39 577.77
22.04.2016 13:00 584.57 582.93
22.04.2016 19:00 587.91 586.26
23.04.2016 01:00 590.13 588.48
23.04.2016 07:00 592.6 590.95
23.04.2016 13:00 595.09 593.43
23.04.2016 19:00 598.07 596.4
24.04.2016 01:00 600.96 599.28
24.04.2016 07:00 603.76 602.07
24.04.2016 13:00 605.22 603.53
24.04.2016 19:00 608.49 606.79
25.04.2016 01:00 613.02 611.3
25.04.2016 07:00 615.6 613.87
25.04.2016 13:00 618.56 616.82
25.04.2016 19:00 621.33 619.59
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Attachment 4
date al at au be bg br by ca ch
11.02.16 8 8 24 16 16 8 104 80
12.02.16 120 32 8 32 16 16 8 8 88
13.02.16 8 8 56 32 8 16 8 128 8
14.02.16 128 120 48 32 8 8 8 8 88
15.02.16 128 120 48 32 8 8 8 8 88
16.02.16 8 8 8 8
17.02.16 88 128 16 8 16 8 8 64
18.02.16 128 32 48 32 16 24 8 8 88
19.02.16 8 8 8 8 48 736 8 120 96
20.02.16 8 8 40 32 16 16 8 128 88
21.02.16 8 8 8 8 40 696 8 120 96
22.02.16 120 8 32 8 8 8 32 88
23.02.16 120 160 8 24 8 8 32 88
24.02.16 128 8 8 40 496 8 8 8 96
25.02.16 128 128 8 8 24 24 32 32 96
26.02.16 8 136 56 48 496 24 8 128 96
27.02.16 128 152 496 24 8 8 8 96
28.02.16 120 40 8 40 472 24 32 8 88
29.02.16 112 8 16 8 32 8 32 80
01.03.16 8 8 32 472 24 32 112 80
02.03.16 104 8 8 16 8 552 32 72
03.03.16 104 144 40 456 24 24 32 80
04.03.16 112 152 464 32 32 608 32 80
05.03.16 112 8 40 472 16 8 32 88
06.03.16 8 32 48 8 48 640 8 120 8
07.03.16 112 8 464 32 8 16 32 88
08.03.16 112 112 8 8 24 8 32 8 72
09.03.16 112 112 8 8 24 8 32 8 72
10.03.16 8 24 24 8
11.03.16 8 8 8 8 32 8 8
12.03.16 8 8 32 472 24 32 112 88
13.03.16 120 128 8 8 40 744 8 8 80
14.03.16 8 112 8 32 8 16 8 120 88
15.03.16 120 8 456 40 8 8 8 88
16.03.16 8 120 8 8 24 8 32 128 8
17.03.16 120 128 8 8 40 712 8 8 88
18.03.16 128 32 8 32 16 16 8 40 88
19.03.16 136 144 8 16 24 24 40 40 88
20.03.16 8 8 56 40 16 24 8 8 88
21.03.16 128 8 8 40 488 24 8 48 96
22.03.16 112 8 8 40 480 24 8 40 88
23.03.16 128 8 16 24 8 32 8 88
24.03.16 8 32 8 40 496 24 8 120 96
25.03.16 8 8 56 8 48 760 8 120 96
26.03.16 136 144 192 488 40 8 8 40 96
27.03.16 8 8 8 8 40 760 8 128 8
28.03.16 8 32 8 40 16 16 8 128 104
29.03.16 128 184 24 8 8 8 40 96
30.03.16 8 144 8 40 480 16 8 120 88
31.03.16 8 24 8 472 40 8 8 120 8
01.04.16 128 136 184 496 40 8 8 40 104
02.04.16 8 176 480 40 8 32 120 88
03.04.16 8 8 56 8 40 736 8 120 104
04.04.16 128 8 8 32 16 16 8 8 88
05.04.16 8 56 32 16 16 8 120 96
06.04.16 128 8 40 480 8 8 8 88
07.04.16 8 56 8 16 24 8 8 112 88
08.04.16 112 56 8 8 32 24 8 40 80
09.04.16 8 176 24 8 8 8 112 8
10.04.16 8 200 496 40 8 8 128 80
11.04.16 8 8 56 40 24 16 8 136 88
12.04.16 136 152 8 48 512 24 8 8 104
13.04.16 120 8 40 704 32 16 48 96
14.04.16 8 32 8 496 32 8 32 120 8
15.04.16 112 8 16 40 32 8 24 8 88
16.04.16 120 184 488 32 8 8 32 96
17.04.16 8 32 8 8 24 8 8 120 96
5
date cz de dk do ee eg es f fr
11.02.16 8 32 488 8 8 8 8 8 40
12.02.16 48 40 496 8 8 8 8 8 40
13.02.16 8 40 488 16 32 8 8 8 48
14.02.16 8 32 496 8 8 8 16 8 32
15.02.16 8 32 496 8 8 8 16 8 32
16.02.16 8 8 8 8 8
17.02.16 8 16 488 8 8 24 200 8 24
18.02.16 8 40 496 8 24 8 8 8 40
19.02.16 8 24 8 8 8 16 8 24 32
20.02.16 8 32 488 8 16 8 16 8 40
21.02.16 8 24 8 16 8 16 8 24 32
22.02.16 168 24 664 8 8 32 8 24 32
23.02.16 8 680 32 8 16 8 280 32 472
24.02.16 48 8 32 8 16 40 176 8 8
25.02.16 8 720 32 8 16 8 176 8 488
26.02.16 8 8 32 8 8 48 16 8 8
27.02.16 8 16 8 8 8 32 8 32 24
28.02.16 40 8 24 8 16 48 16 8 8
29.02.16 144 24 632 8 8 32 8 8 24
01.03.16 40 8 24 16 16 32 8 8 8
02.03.16 144 8 16 8 32 464 8 8 624
03.03.16 8 8 24 8 8 40 8 8 8
04.03.16 8 16 8 8 16 32 248 16 24
05.03.16 8 8 24 8 16 40 144 8 8
06.03.16 8 24 8 16 8 16 8 24 24
07.03.16 8 16 8 8 16 32 144 8 24
08.03.16 8 672 32 8 16 8 160 8 464
09.03.16 8 672 32 8 16 8 160 8 464
10.03.16 8 8 8
11.03.16 8 8 8 8 8 8 24 8
12.03.16 8 8 24 8 16 40 160 8 8
13.03.16 48 24 8 8 16 8 8 24 32
14.03.16 48 32 472 8 24 8 16 8 40
15.03.16 48 16 8 8 16 32 160 32 24
16.03.16 56 704 32 16 8 8 16 8 464
17.03.16 48 24 16 8 24 8 16 32 24
18.03.16 8 32 480 8 24 8 16 8 48
19.03.16 48 744 32 8 16 8 16 8 480
20.03.16 40 40 480 8 24 8 16 8 40
21.03.16 8 8 24 8 16 48 184 8 16
22.03.16 8 8 24 8 8 48 8 8 16
23.03.16 8 744 40 8 16 8 176 8 472
24.03.16 8 8 24 8 8 40 8 8 16
25.03.16 8 24 16 8 24 8 8 24 32
26.03.16 8 24 8 8 16 32 304 32 24
27.03.16 56 24 16 16 24 8 8 24 32
28.03.16 56 40 480 8 24 8 16 8 48
29.03.16 8 8 712 8 16 40 280 8 32
30.03.16 48 8 24 8 24 48 16 8 8
31.03.16 8 16 8 16 16 32 176 32 24
01.04.16 8 16 8 8 16 32 280 32 24
02.04.16 8 16 8 8 16 32 280 8 24
03.04.16 8 24 16 8 24 8 16 24 40
04.04.16 56 40 488 8 24 8 16 8 40
05.04.16 8 32 488 8 24 8 16 8 48
06.04.16 64 8 24 8 8 48 16 8 8
07.04.16 56 696 40 8 16 8 168 8 480
08.04.16 8 680 32 8 24 8 168 8 480
09.04.16 16 24 656 16 16 40 312 8 40
10.04.16 8 16 8 8 16 32 344 8 32
11.04.16 8 40 504 8 8 8 16 24 48
12.04.16 56 8 24 8 8 40 16 8 8
13.04.16 200 8 16 8 48 16 8 8 8
14.04.16 48 16 8 16 16 32 176 8 24
15.04.16 48 472 40 8 16 8 16 688 8
16.04.16 16 16 8 8 16 32 304 32 32
17.04.16 56 680 40 8 8 8 16 24 488
6
date gb gr hr hu id ie il im in
11.02.16 48 16 24 688 8 160 8 8 8
12.02.16 176 16 32 744 16 8 8 8 8
13.02.16 8 96 24 768 8 8 32 8 184
14.02.16 8 16 24 752 8 8 8 8 176
15.02.16 8 16 24 752 8 8 8 8 176
16.02.16 8 8 8 16 16 8
17.02.16 8 8 8 8 112 8 8 8
18.02.16 8 16 32 768 8 8 40 8 8
19.02.16 48 16 480 8 8 8 32 8 8
20.02.16 8 16 24 680 8 8 40 8 168
21.02.16 48 8 472 8 8 8 8 24 8
22.02.16 8 16 16 8 280 160 8 8 16
23.02.16 8 16 8 24 160 16 8 120 8
24.02.16 160 16 40 16 16 8 8 8 8
25.02.16 152 16 8 8 16 8 8 8 8
26.02.16 8 16 40 16 8 8 8 8 160
27.02.16 8 16 704 8 256 168 8 8 8
28.02.16 8 16 24 8 8 8 8 8 152
29.02.16 8 16 16 8 240 144 8 120 8
01.03.16 136 8 32 8 16 8 8 8
02.03.16 8 8 8 8 240 144 8 8
03.03.16 8 16 24 16 16 8 8 8 8
04.03.16 8 16 664 8 152 8 8 8
05.03.16 136 16 32 664 8 8 8 112 8
06.03.16 8 80 456 8 8 8 8 8 8
07.03.16 160 16 656 8 16 8 8 120 8
08.03.16 160 16 8 24 16 8 8 8 8
09.03.16 160 16 8 24 16 8 8 8 8
10.03.16 8 8 8 8 8
11.03.16 8 16 8 16 8 8 8 40
12.03.16 152 16 40 16 16 8 8 56 8
13.03.16 8 16 488 8 8 8 48 8 160
14.03.16 8 16 24 680 16 8 32 8 152
15.03.16 8 16 704 8 16 8 8 56 168
16.03.16 8 96 8 24 8 8 8 8 160
17.03.16 8 16 480 8 8 8 40 8 176
18.03.16 184 16 24 736 8 8 40 8 8
19.03.16 8 16 8 8 8 8 16 8 192
20.03.16 8 16 32 728 8 8 40 8 8
21.03.16 200 16 40 16 16 8 8 8 8
22.03.16 192 16 40 16 16 8 16 8 8
23.03.16 192 16 8 24 16 8 8 136 8
24.03.16 192 16 40 16 16 8 16 8 8
25.03.16 8 16 496 8 8 8 40 16 8
26.03.16 8 16 760 8 192 16 8 8 8
27.03.16 8 96 496 8 8 8 40 8 200
28.03.16 8 16 24 752 8 8 16 8 192
29.03.16 8 16 24 8 176 16 8 32 8
30.03.16 8 16 40 16 8 8 40 8 184
31.03.16 192 88 704 8 16 8 8 8 8
01.04.16 8 16 736 8 184 16 8 8 8
02.04.16 8 16 688 24 168 16 8 32 8
03.04.16 8 16 480 8 8 8 32 8 184
04.04.16 8 16 24 736 8 8 40 8 192
05.04.16 8 16 24 704 8 8 40 8 184
06.04.16 8 16 40 16 8 8 16 56 192
07.04.16 192 16 8 24 16 8 8 8 8
08.04.16 168 16 8 8 16 8 8 8 8
09.04.16 8 88 16 8 168 16 8 56 8
10.04.16 8 16 744 8 176 16 8 136 8
11.04.16 16 16 24 752 16 8 16 8 200
12.04.16 8 16 40 24 16 8 16 8 216
13.04.16 8 16 24 8 344 168 8 8 8
14.04.16 192 88 720 24 16 16 8 8 8
15.04.16 184 16 8 40 8 8 32 8 8
16.04.16 8 16 680 24 168 16 8 56 8
17.04.16 192 16 8 16 8 8 16 8 8
7
date is it jp kr kz lt lu lv md
11.02.16 32 8 8 8 24 24 16 8 8
12.02.16 32 32 8 8 24 16 16 24 8
13.02.16 32 8 8 744 24 8 16 8 8
14.02.16 8 32 8 728 24 24 16 32 32
15.02.16 8 32 8 728 24 24 16 32 32
16.02.16 8 48 8 8
17.02.16 440 24 8 24 8 32 8 16 8
18.02.16 24 32 8 8 24 8 24 8 8
19.02.16 8 8 32 8 8 24 8 8 8
20.02.16 8 8 8 8 24 8 16 8 32
21.02.16 8 8 32 8 16 24 8 16 8
22.02.16 8 48 8 8 8 48 8 16 16
23.02.16 16 8 8 8 8 8 8 16 16
24.02.16 8 32 736 696 24 16 8 8 32
25.02.16 8 8 16 8 8 16 8 8 8
26.02.16 32 8 744 16 8 16 16 32 8
27.02.16 16 32 24 8 8 8 40 16 24
28.02.16 8 32 688 8 8 16 8 8 8
29.02.16 8 40 8 8 8 32 8 16 584
01.03.16 8 8 624 56 8 16 8 16 8
02.03.16 8 40 32 16 32 32 8 8
03.03.16 16 48 640 8 8 16 16 24 16
04.03.16 8 48 24 112 8 8 40 16 8
05.03.16 32 8 8 8 24 16 8 8 8
06.03.16 8 32 32 568 16 24 8 8 8
07.03.16 24 8 32 8 32 16 40 8 8
08.03.16 8 24 24 8 8 16 8 8 8
09.03.16 8 24 24 8 8 16 8 8 8
10.03.16 8
11.03.16 32 136 8 8 8 16
12.03.16 8 32 680 8 8 16 8 8 8
13.03.16 8 32 32 672 16 8 16 8 8
14.03.16 32 32 8 8 24 8 16 8 8
15.03.16 8 32 24 8 8 16 40 8 8
16.03.16 8 32 24 8 8 16 8 24 8
17.03.16 8 40 32 688 24 8 16 8 8
18.03.16 8 8 8 8 24 8 16 8 32
19.03.16 8 8 16 8 8 16 8 8 8
20.03.16 8 128 8 8 24 8 16 8 32
21.03.16 32 8 744 752 8 16 8 8 8
22.03.16 32 8 696 728 8 16 16 16 8
23.03.16 8 40 16 8 8 16 8 8 16
24.03.16 32 40 768 8 8 16 24 24 8
25.03.16 8 8 32 16 24 8 16 8 8
26.03.16 8 48 24 8 8 8 40 16 8
27.03.16 8 40 40 8 24 8 16 8 8
28.03.16 8 8 8 8 24 16 16 8 32
29.03.16 8 56 24 56 32 48 8 16 16
30.03.16 32 8 736 736 8 16 16 8 8
31.03.16 8 32 16 8 8 16 40 8 8
01.04.16 8 8 24 8 8 8 40 16 16
02.04.16 8 32 8 56 8 8 48 16 8
03.04.16 8 8 40 8 24 8 16 8 8
04.04.16 8 32 8 16 24 8 16 8 24
05.04.16 24 8 8 728 24 8 16 8 8
06.04.16 32 40 712 8 24 16 16 24 8
07.04.16 32 40 16 8 8 16 8 8 8
08.04.16 8 8 16 8 8 16 8 8 32
09.04.16 16 40 8 8 32 40 8 16 8
10.04.16 16 40 24 8 32 8 40 24 8
11.04.16 8 8 8 8 8 16 16 24 8
12.04.16 32 40 800 8 8 16 16 24 8
13.04.16 8 56 8 8 8 8 32 16 16
14.04.16 8 40 8 712 8 16 48 8 8
15.04.16 24 40 24 16 8 8 16 8 8
16.04.16 8 8 8 8 8 8 40 16 16
17.04.16 8 40 8 8 8 16 16 24 16
8
date mk mx my nl nz no pa pl pt
11.02.16 24 8 16 8 272 32 40 160
12.02.16 8 8 288 8 32 8 40 8
13.02.16 136 8 8 176 8 8 8 40 304
14.02.16 32 32 8 288 8 32 8 40 8
15.02.16 32 32 8 288 8 32 8 40 8
16.02.16 8 8 8 8 16 8 8
17.02.16 8 32 16 8 16 8 8
18.02.16 64 184 184 16 8 8 48 304
19.02.16 64 8 160 168 8 8 8 8 280
20.02.16 24 8 8 168 8 8 8 40 288
21.02.16 8 616 168 8 8 288 40 8 168
22.02.16 32 8 8 16 8 24 8 8
23.02.16 8 32 8 8 8 24 8
24.02.16 128 8 8 8 24 8 8 8 40
25.02.16 32 64 8 8 24 8 8 32 48
26.02.16 32 64 8 280 8 40 8 8 8
27.02.16 40 16 8 16 8 24 40 8
28.02.16 8 8 264 24 32 8 8 8
29.02.16 8 8 16 8 24 8 8
01.03.16 8 256 8 24 8 8 8
02.03.16 16 8 16 8 16 24 8
03.03.16 32 8 240 8 24 8 8 8
04.03.16 8 32 8 8 8 32 8
05.03.16 8 8 16 8 8 8 32
06.03.16 8 136 16 8 264 40 8 152
07.03.16 8 8 24 8 8 40 32
08.03.16 24 64 8 8 24 8 8 32 32
09.03.16 24 64 8 8 24 8 8 32 32
10.03.16 8
11.03.16 8 8 8 8 8 8 40
12.03.16 112 8 8 24 8 8 8 56
13.03.16 24 8 8 168 8 8 8 8 288
14.03.16 32 56 8 168 8 8 8 40 264
15.03.16 128 8 8 16 8 8 40 40
16.03.16 32 56 8 272 8 32 8 32 8
17.03.16 32 56 8 168 8 8 8 8 272
18.03.16 8 8 184 8 8 8 40 288
19.03.16 32 48 8 288 24 40 8 32 8
20.03.16 136 8 192 192 8 8 16 48 288
21.03.16 152 8 8 8 24 16 8 8 32
22.03.16 128 8 8 288 8 32 8 8 8
23.03.16 8 8 16 16 8 32 40
24.03.16 8 8 296 8 40 8 8 8
25.03.16 8 8 208 176 8 8 16 8 288
26.03.16 40 48 8 40 8 8 8 48 16
27.03.16 8 16 8 184 8 8 16 8 296
28.03.16 8 8 8 288 8 40 8 48 8
29.03.16 8 40 8 8 8 8 16
30.03.16 40 8 8 176 8 8 16 8 280
31.03.16 48 8 8 24 16 8 40 40
01.04.16 40 56 16 40 8 8 8 40 16
02.04.16 8 40 8 8 8 40 16
03.04.16 56 8 8 176 8 8 16 8 280
04.04.16 144 8 8 8 8 8 16 40 288
05.04.16 144 8 8 8 8 16 40 280
06.04.16 152 8 304 8 40 16 8 8
07.04.16 8 8 8 8 24 16 8 32 40
08.04.16 8 8 8 8 24 16 8 32 40
09.04.16 128 8 32 8 8 8 16 16
10.04.16 8 40 8 8 8 48 16
11.04.16 8 8 8 360 8 40 8 40 8
12.04.16 40 8 8 360 8 40 8 8 8
13.04.16 40 16 16 16 8 24 480 8
14.04.16 56 8 8 24 16 8 40 40
15.04.16 8 8 8 8 8 8 16 8 296
16.04.16 40 16 40 8 8 8 32 16
17.04.16 8 8 304 8 32 8 32 8
9
date ro ru rs se sg si sk tr tw
11.02.16 16 8 16 8 8 8 8 56
12.02.16 8 168 16 128 8 8 8 8 8
13.02.16 16 8 8 64 8 16 8 8 8
14.02.16 8 168 8 8 8 16 56 8 8
15.02.16 8 168 8 8 8 16 56 8 8
16.02.16 8 8 8
17.02.16 24 8 40 8 88 8
18.02.16 16 16 24 128 16 8 752 8 8
19.02.16 16 16 8 8 24 672 16 8 8
20.02.16 16 8 8 8 8 672 64 8 8
21.02.16 16 16 8 8 8 8 8 8 16
22.02.16 24 40 608 8 8 8 8 56
23.02.16 40 8 8 648 56 8 16 8
24.02.16 8 296 16 64 8 8 8 8 8
25.02.16 48 272 24 8 16 8 688 8 8
26.02.16 8 192 16 8 16 8 768 8 8
27.02.16 8 32 8 672 8 8 8 56
28.02.16 8 160 16 128 16 8 8 8 8
29.02.16 32 32 8 8 56 8 8 8
01.03.16 8 152 592 16 120 8 8 24
02.03.16 8 24 56 8 24 16
03.03.16 8 144 584 8 8 8 8 56
04.03.16 8 8 8 8 32 8 24
05.03.16 8 248 16 16 56 8 8 8
06.03.16 16 8 8 104 32 8 16 8 8
07.03.16 8 264 8 632 8 8 8 56
08.03.16 40 272 16 8 8 8 616 8 8
09.03.16 40 272 16 8 8 8 616 8 8
10.03.16 8
11.03.16 136 56 8
12.03.16 8 272 8 24 16 8 8 8 8
13.03.16 16 24 8 56 32 8 16 8 8
14.03.16 16 8 16 8 8 8 632 8 8
15.03.16 8 272 8 32 16 8 8 8 8
16.03.16 40 160 8 8 16 8 8 8 8
17.03.16 16 8 8 8 32 16 24 8 8
18.03.16 16 8 8 136 8 696 24 8 8
19.03.16 40 184 16 8 16 8 728 8 8
20.03.16 16 16 8 56 8 736 24 8 8
21.03.16 8 296 16 56 8 8 8 8 8
22.03.16 8 176 8 24 8 8 8 8 8
23.03.16 40 288 720 56 24 8 8 8
24.03.16 8 168 16 152 8 8 760 8 8
25.03.16 16 16 8 8 32 24 8 8 736
26.03.16 8 8 8 8 16 8 8 16 8
27.03.16 16 16 8 8 32 8 8 8 16
28.03.16 8 184 8 8 8 720 56 8 8
29.03.16 32 8 8 680 8 8 24 128
30.03.16 8 8 8 56 8 8 16 8 8
31.03.16 8 288 8 128 16 8 8 8 8
01.04.16 8 8 24 8 8 8 704 24 8
02.04.16 8 8 16 8 8 8 24 136
03.04.16 16 8 8 8 32 24 8 8 744
04.04.16 16 168 8 56 8 8 8 8 704
05.04.16 16 184 16 32 8 8 8 8 8
06.04.16 8 184 16 32 8 8 712 8 8
07.04.16 48 312 16 8 8 712 16 8 16
08.04.16 40 296 8 8 8 16 16 8 640
09.04.16 32 8 8 32 16 8 8 24 8
10.04.16 8 8 720 16 8 8 24 64
11.04.16 8 184 8 8 32 16 16 8 760
12.04.16 8 208 16 32 8 864 64 8 8
13.04.16 40 32 728 8 8 8 8 56
14.04.16 8 288 8 144 8 8 8 8 8
15.04.16 16 168 32 8 8 8 8 8 16
16.04.16 8 8 16 8 8 8 16 8
17.04.16 48 168 8 128 16 8 8 8 8
10
date ua us vn ?? Total
11.02.16 96 616 32 8 752
12.02.16 56 696 8 8 768
13.02.16 8 24 32 8 72
14.02.16 8 16 8 8 40
15.02.16 8 16 8 8 40
16.02.16 8 8
17.02.16 8 32 400 440
18.02.16 8 8 8 8 32
19.02.16 8 16 32 40 96
20.02.16 8 8 24 8 48
21.02.16 8 24 32 40 104
22.02.16 128 8 8 456 600
23.02.16 32 8 40 40 120
24.02.16 8 24 8 24 64
25.02.16 8 8 56 40 112
26.02.16 8 8 32 32 80
27.02.16 128 8 48 8 192
28.02.16 56 664 8 32 760
29.02.16 24 8 8 464 504
01.03.16 8 32 32 72
02.03.16 104 8 32 144
03.03.16 120 8 8 24 160
04.03.16 56 8 8 72
05.03.16 32 584 48 32 696
06.03.16 56 16 8 40 120
07.03.16 32 8 48 8 96
08.03.16 8 8 48 40 104
09.03.16 8 8 48 40 104
10.03.16 8 8
11.03.16 8 152 160
12.03.16 8 616 48 32 704
13.03.16 8 16 8 40 72
14.03.16 8 8 8 8 32
15.03.16 8 664 8 16 696
16.03.16 8 648 8 32 696
17.03.16 8 16 8 40 72
18.03.16 56 8 48 8 120
19.03.16 8 8 8 32 56
20.03.16 8 16 8 8 40
21.03.16 8 24 48 32 112
22.03.16 8 56 56 24 144
23.03.16 32 8 48 40 128
24.03.16 56 8 56 40 160
25.03.16 8 8 40 48 104
26.03.16 8 712 8 16 744
27.03.16 752 8 8 48 816
28.03.16 8 16 32 8 64
29.03.16 8 8 488 504
30.03.16 8 8 32 32 80
31.03.16 8 696 48 16 768
01.04.16 8 8 48 16 80
02.04.16 672 48 8 728
03.04.16 8 8 40 48 104
04.04.16 8 16 8 8 40
05.04.16 56 16 40 8 120
06.04.16 8 24 8 32 72
07.04.16 8 8 8 40 64
08.04.16 8 8 56 32 104
09.04.16 8 704 56 480 1248
10.04.16 32 8 56 16 112
11.04.16 8 8 32 8 56
12.04.16 8 8 8 40 64
13.04.16 128 8 8 24 168
14.04.16 8 24 8 8 48
15.04.16 672 8 8 8 696
16.04.16 144 680 48 8 880
17.04.16 56 656 8 32 752
